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Abstract—In this paper, aiming at securing range query, top-k
query, and skyline query in tiered sensor networks, we propose
the Secure Range Query (SRQ), Secure Top-k Query (STQ), and
Secure Skyline Query (SSQ) schemes, respectively. In particular,
SRQ, by using our proposed prime aggregation technique, has
the lowest communication overhead among prior works, while
STQ and SSQ, to our knowledge, are the first proposals in
tiered sensor networks for securing top-k and skyline queries,
respectively. Moreover, the relatively unexplored issue of the
security impact of sensor node compromises on multidimensional
queries is studied; two attacks incurred from the sensor node
compromises, collusion attack and false-incrimination attack, are
investigated in this paper. After developing a novel technique
called subtree sampling, we also explore methods of efficiently
mitigating the threat of sensor node compromises. Performance
analyses regarding the probability for detecting incomplete
query-results and communication cost of the proposed schemes
are also studied.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tiered Sensor Networks. Sensor networks are expected to
be deployed on some harsh or hostile regions for data collec-
tion or environment monitoring. Since there is the possibility
of no stable connection between the authority and the network,
in-network storage is necessary for caching or storing the
data sensed by sensor nodes. A straightforward method is to
attach external storage to each node, but this is economically
infeasible. Therefore, various data storage models for sensor
networks have been studied in the literature. In [6], [22], a
notion of tiered sensor networks was discussed by introducing
an intermediate tier between the authority and the sensor
nodes. The purpose of this tier is to cache the sensed data
so that the authority can efficiently retrieve the cache data,
avoiding unnecessary communication with sensor nodes.
The network model considered in this paper is the same
as the ones in [6], [22]. More specifically, some storage-
abundant nodes, called storage nodes, which are equipped with
several gigabytes of NAND flash storage [24], are deployed
as the intermediate tier for data archival and query response.
In practice, some currently available sensor nodes such as
RISE [21] and StarGate [29] can work as the storage nodes.
The performance of sensor networks wherein external flash
memory is attached to the sensor nodes was also studied in
[15]. In addition, some theoretical issues concerning the tiered
sensor networks, such as the optimal storage node placement,
were also studied in [24], [30]. In fact, such a two-tiered
network architecture has been demonstrated to be useful in
increasing network capacity and scalability, reducing network
management complexity, and prolonging network lifetime.
Multidimensional Queries. Although a large amount of
sensed data can be stored in storage nodes, the authority
might be interested in only some portions of them. To this
end, the authority issues proper queries to retrieve the desired
portion of sensed data. Note that, when the sensed data have
multiple attributes, the query could be multidimensional. We
have observed that range query, top-k query, and skyline query
are the most commonly used queries. Range query [12], [17],
which could be useful for correlating events occurring within
the network, is used to retrieve sensed data whose attributes
are individually within a specified range. After mapping the
sensed data to a ranking value, top-k query [33], which can be
used to extract or observe the extreme phenomenon, is used to
retrieve the sensed data whose ranking values are among the
first k priority. Skyline query [5], [11], due to its promising
application in multi-criteria decision making, is also useful and
important in environment monitoring, industry control, etc.
Nonetheless, in the tiered network model, the storage nodes
become the targets that are easily compromised because of
their significant roles in responding to queries. For example,
the adversary can eavesdrop on the communications among
nodes or compromise the storage nodes to obtain the sensed
data, resulting in the breach of data confidentiality. After the
compromise of storage nodes, the adversary can also return
falsified query-results to the authority, leading to the breach
of query-result authenticity. Even more, the compromised
storage nodes can cause query-result incompleteness, creating
an incomplete query-result for the authority by dropping some
portions of the query-result.
Related Work. Secure range queries in tiered sensor
networks have been studied only in [23], [31], [40]. Data
confidentiality and query-result authenticity can be preserved
very well in [23], [31], [40] owing to the use of the bucket
scheme [8], [9]. Unfortunately, encoding approach [23] is only
suitable for the one-dimensional query scenario in the sensor
networks for environment monitoring purposes. On the other
hand, crosscheck approaches [31], [40] can be applied on
sensor networks for event-driven purposes at the expense of the
reduced probability for detecting query-result incompleteness.
The security issues incurred from the compromise of storage
nodes have been addressed in [23], [31], [40]. The impact of
collusion attacks defined as the collusion among compromised
sensor nodes and compromised storage nodes, however, was
2only discussed in [40], wherein only a naive method was
proposed as a countermeasure. When the compromised sensor
nodes are taken into account, a Denial-of-Service attack, called
false-incrimination attack, not addressed in the literature, can
be extremely harmful. In such an attack, the compromised
sensor nodes subvert the functionality of the secure query
schemes by simply claiming that their sensed data have been
dropped by the storage nodes. After that, the innocent storage
nodes will be considered compromised and will be revoked by
the authority. It should be noted that all the previous solutions
suffer from false-incrimination attacks.
Contribution. Our major contributions are:
• The Secure Range Query (SRQ) scheme is proposed to
secure the range query in tiered networks (Sec. III-A).
By taking advantage of our proposed prime aggregation
technique for securely transmitting the amount of data
in specified buckets, SRQ has the lowest communication
cost among prior works in all scenarios (environment
monitoring and event detection purposes), while preserv-
ing the probability for detecting incomplete query-results
close to 1. It should be noted that although incorporating
bucket scheme [8], [9] (described in Sec. III-A1) in the
protocol design [23], [31], [40] is not new, the novelty
of our method lies on the use of prime aggregation
in reducing the overhead and guaranteeing query-result
completeness.
• For the first time in the literature, the issues of securing
top-k and skyline queries in tiered networks are studied
(Secs. III-B and III-C). Our solutions to these two issues
are Secure Top-k Query (STQ) and Secure Skyline Query
(SSQ), respectively. The former is built upon the pro-
posed SRQ scheme to detect query-result completeness,
while the efficiency of SSQ is based on our proposed
grouping technique.
• The security impact of sensor compromises is studied
(Sec. V); collusion attack is formally addressed, and a
new Denial-of-Service attack, false-incrimination attack,
which can thwart the security purpose in prior works,
is first identified in our paper. The resiliency of SRQ,
STQ, and SSQ against these two attacks is investigated.
With a novel technique called subtree sampling, some
minor modifications are introduced for SRQ and STQ
as countermeasures to these two attacks. Moreover, the
compromised nodes can even be efficiently identified and
be further attested [25], [26], [28].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In general, the models used in this paper are very similar
to those in [6], [22], [23], [31], [40].
Network Model. As shown in Fig. 1, the sensor network
considered in this paper is composed of a large number of
resource-constrained sensor nodes and a few so-called storage
nodes. Storage nodes are assumed to be storage-abundant and
may be compromised. In addition, in certain cases, storage
nodes could also have abundant resources in energy, computa-
tion, and communication. The storage nodes can communicate
with the authority via direct or multi-hop communications. The
network is connected such that, for two arbitrary nodes, at least
one path connecting them can be found.
A cell is composed of a storage node and a number of
sensor nodes. In a cell, sensor nodes could be far away
from the associated storage node so that they can com-
municate with each other only through multi-hop commu-
nication. For example, in Fig. 1, without the relay of the
gray node, the black node cannot reach the storage node.
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Fig. 1: A tiered sensor network.
The nodes in the network
have synchronized clocks
[27] and the time is divided
into epochs. As in [23],
[24], [31], [40], each node
is assumed to be aware of
the geographic position it
locates [14], [38] so that
the association between the
sensor node and storage
node can be established. As
a matter of fact, informa-
tion about the time and ge-
ographic position is indis-
pensable for most sensor
network applications.
For each cell, aggregation is assumed to be performed
over an aggregation tree rooted at the storage node. Since
the optimization of the aggregation tree structure is out of
the scope of this paper, we adopt the method described in
TAG [16] to construct an aggregation tree. We follow the
conventional assumption that the topology of the aggregation
tree is known by the authority [2], [4]. Similar to sensor nodes,
storage nodes also perform the sensing task. Each sensor node
senses the data and temporarily stores the sensed data in its
local memory within an epoch. At the end of each epoch,
the sensor nodes in a cell report the sensed data stored in
local memory to the associated storage node. Throughout this
paper, we focus on a cell C, composed of N−1 sensor nodes,
{si}N−1i=1 , and a storage node M.
Security Model. We consider the adversary who can com-
promise an arbitrary number of storage nodes. After node
compromises, all the information stored in the compromised
storage nodes will be exposed to the adversary. The goal
of the adversary is to breach at least one of the following:
data confidentiality, query-result authenticity, and query-result
completeness. We temporarily do not consider the compromise
of sensor nodes in describing SRQ, STQ, and SSQ in Sec. III.
The impact of sensor node compromise on the security breach,
however, will be explored in Sec. V. Many security issues
in sensor networks, such as key management [3], [7], [36],
broadcast authentication [13], [19], and secure localization
[14], [38], have been studied in the literature. This paper fo-
cuses on securing multidimensional queries that are relatively
unexplored in the literature, while the protocol design of the
aforementioned issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
Query Model. The sensed data can be represented as a d-
3dimensional tuple, (A1, A2, . . . , Ad), where Ag , ∀g ∈ [1, d],
denotes the g-th attribute. The authority may issue a proper d-
dimensional query to retrieve the desired portion of data stored
in storage nodes. Three types of queries, including range query,
top-k query, and skyline query, are considered in this paper.
For range query, its form, issued by the authority, is expressed
as 〈C, t, l1, h1, . . . , ld, hd〉, which means that the sensed data to
be reported to the authority should be generated by the nodes
in cell C at epoch t, and their g-th attributes, Ag’s, should be
within the range of [lg, hg], g ∈ [1, d]. Top-k query is usually
associated with a scalar (linear) ranking function. With ranking
function, R, the sensed data, even if it is multidimensional, can
be individually mapped to a one-dimensional ranking value.
The top-k query issued by the authority is in the form of
〈C, t, R, k〉. As the first attempt to achieve secure top-k query,
the goal of top-k query in this paper is simply assumed to
obtain the sensed data generated by the nodes in cell C at epoch
t with the first k smallest ranking values. For skyline query,
the desired skyline data are defined as those not dominated by
any other data. Assuming that smaller values are preferable to
large ones for all attributes, for a set of d-dimensional data, a
datum ci dominates another datum cj if both the conditions,
Ag(ci) ≤ Ag(cj), ∀g ∈ [1, d], and Ag(ci) < Ag(cj), ∃g ∈
[1, d], where Ag(ci) denotes the g-th attribute value of the
datum ci, hold. Hence, the form of the skyline query issued
by the authority is given as 〈C, t〉, which is used to retrieve
the skyline data generated in cell C at epoch t.
III. SECURING MULTIDIMENSIONAL QUERIES
In this section, aiming at securing range query, top-k query,
and skyline query, we propose the SRQ (Sec. III-A), STQ
(Sec. III-B), and SSQ (Sec. III-C) schemes, respectively. Note
that though SRQ, STQ, and SSQ use the bucket scheme [8],
[9], the novelty of them is due to their design in efficiently
detecting the incomplete query-result (described later).
A. Securing Range Queries (SRQ)
Our proposed SRQ scheme consists of a confidentiality-
preserving reporting phase (Sec. III-A1) that can simultane-
ously prevent the adversary from accessing data stored in
the storage nodes, authenticate the query results, and ensure
efficient multidimensional query processing, and a query-result
completeness verification phase (Sec. III-A2) for guaranteeing
the completeness of query-results.
1) Confidentiality-preserving reporting: Data encryption is
a straightforward and common method of ensuring data confi-
dentiality against a compromised storage node. Moreover, we
hope that even when the adversary compromises the storage
node, the previously stored information should not be exposed
to the adversary. To this end, the keys used in encryption
should be selected from a one-way hash chain. In particular,
assume that a key Ki,0 is initially stored in sensor node si.
At the beginning of epoch t, the key Ki,t, which is used only
within epoch t, is calculated as hash(Ki,t−1), where hash(·)
is a hash function, and Ki,t−1 is dropped. Suppose that sensor
node si has sensed data D at epoch t. One method for storing
D in the storage node M while preserving the privacy is to
send {D}Ki,t , which denotes the encryption of D with the
key Ki,t. With this method, when an OCB-like authenticated
encryption primitive [20] is exploited, the authenticity of D
can be guaranteed. At the same time, D will not be known
by the adversary during message forwarding and even after
the compromise of the storage node at epoch t because the
adversary cannot recover the keys used in the time before
epoch t. Nevertheless, no query can be answered by M if
only encrypted data is stored in M. Hence, the bucket scheme
proposed in [8], [9], which uses the encryption keys generated
via a one-way hash chain, is used in the SRQ scheme.
In the bucket scheme, the domain of each attribute Ag ,
∀g ∈ [1, d], is assumed to be known in advance, and is
divided into wg ≥ 1 consecutive non-overlapping intervals
sequentially indexed from 1 to wg , under a publicly known
partitioning rule. For ease of representation, in the following,
we assume that wg = w, ∀g ∈ [1, d]. A d-dimensional bucket
is defined as a tuple, (v1, v2, . . . , vd) (hereafter called bucket
ID), where vg ∈ [1, w], g ∈ [1, d]. The sensor node si, when
it has sensed data at epoch t, sends to M the corresponding
bucket IDs, which are constructed by mapping each attribute
of the sensed data to the proper interval index, and the sensed
data encrypted by the key Ki,t. For example, when si has
sensed data (1, 3), (2, 4), and (2, 11) at epoch t, the message
transmitted to the storage node at the end of epoch t is
〈i, t, (1, 1), {(1, 3), (2, 4)}Ki,t, (1, 2), {(2, 11)}Ki,t〉, assuming
that A1, A2 ∈ [1, 20], w = 2, and each interval length, set at
10, is the same.
Let V be the set of all possible bucket IDs. Assume that
there are on average Y and Y/N data generated in a cell and
in a node, respectively, at epoch t. Assume that, Di,t,V is a
set containing all the data within the bucket V ∈ V sensed
by si at epoch t. The messages sent from si to M at the
end of epoch t can be abstracted as 〈i, t, Jσ, {Di,t,Jσ}Ki,t〉,
where Jσ ∈ V , Jσ 6= Jσ′ , 1 ≤ σ, σ′ ≤ Y/N if there are some
data sensed by si within epoch t. Note that si sends nothing
to M if Di,t,Jσ ’s, ∀Jσ ∈ V , are empty. After that, M can
answer the range query according to the information revealed
by the bucket IDs. Assume that lg and hg are located within
the αg-th and βg-th intervals, respectively, where αg ≤ βg , αg ,
βg ∈ [1, w], and g ∈ [1, d]. The encrypted data falling into the
buckets in the set A = {(ρ1, . . . , ρd)|αg ≤ ρg ≤ βg, g ∈
[1, d]} are reported to the authority. In other words, once
receiving the range query, M first translates the information
l1, h1, . . . , ld, hd into the proper bucket IDs and then replies
all the encrypted data falling into the buckets1 in A.
Nevertheless, in tiered sensor networks, even when the
original bucket scheme is used, M could still maliciously
drop some encrypted data and only report part of the results
to the authority, resulting in an incomplete query-result. In
1There is a tradeoff between the communication cost and confidentiality
in terms of bucket sizes because larger bucket size implies higher data
confidentiality and higher communication cost due to more superfluous data
being returned to the authority. The design of optimal bucketing strategies is
beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer to [8], [9] for more details.
4the following, we will describe an extended bucket scheme,
which incorporates the prime aggregation strategy into the
original bucket scheme, to detect the incomplete reply in a
communication-efficient manner.
2) Query-Result Completeness Verification: With prime
aggregation technique, SRQ detects an incomplete reply by
taking advantage of aggregation for counting the amount of
sensed data falling into specified buckets. Together with a
hash for verification purpose, the count forms a so-called
proof in detecting an incomplete reply. The storage node M
is required to provide the proof to the authority at the epoch
specified in the query so that the authority can use the proof
to verify the completeness of received query-results. Since in
our design all the sub-proofs generated by the nodes can be
aggregated to yield the final proof, the communication cost can
be significantly reduced. The details are described as follows.
Assume that an aggregation tree [16] has been constructed
after sensor deployment. Recall that the domain of attribute Ag
is divided into w intervals. Before the sensor deployment, a
set {pVi , p∅i |∀i ∈ [1, N−1], V ∈ V} of (wd+1)(N−1) prime
numbers is selected by the authority such that pVi 6= pV
′
i′ and
p∅i 6= p∅i′ if i 6= i′ or V 6= V ′. Then, the set {pVi , p∅i |V ∈ V} of
wd+1 prime numbers, called the set of bucket primes of si, is
stored in each sensor node si. In addition, a set {kVi,0, k∅i,0|V ∈
V} of wd + 1 keys is selected by the authority and is stored
in each sensor node si initially. For fixed i and t, the set of
{kVi,t, k∅i,0|V ∈ V} is called the set of bucket keys of si at epoch
t. Bucket primes could be publicly-known, while bucket keys
should be kept secret. Each sensor node si, at the beginning of
epoch t, calculates kVi,t = hash(kVi,t−1) and then drops kVi,t−1,
∀V ∈ V . In addition, si also calculates k∅i,t = hash(k∅i,t−1)
and then drops k∅i,t−1.
Recall that each node si on average has Y/N sensed data
at epoch t, and assume that the set of Y/N bucket IDs
associated with these Y/N sensed data is Bi,t = {vˆi,t,σ|σ =
1, . . . , Y/N}, which could be a multiset. Then, according to
its sensed data, si calculates Hi,t = hashKi,t(
∑Y/N
σ=1 k
vˆi,t,σ
i,t ),
where hashK(·) denotes the keyed hash function with key
K , if it has sensed data, and Hi,t = hashKi,t(k∅i,t) oth-
erwise. Moreover, si computes Pi,t =
∏Y/N
σ=1 p
vˆi,t,σ
i if it
has sensed data, and Pi,t = p∅i otherwise. Moreover, once
receiving 〈jρ, t, Ejρ,t,Bjρ,t,Hjρ,t,Pjρ,t〉, jρ ∈ [1, N−1], ∀ρ ∈
[1, χ] from its χ children, sj1 , . . . , sjχ , si calculates Ei,t =
(
⋃χ
ρ=1 Ejρ,t)
⋃
Ei,t, where Ei,t denotes the set of encrypted
data sensed by si at epoch t, and Bi,t = (
⋃χ
ρ=1 Bjρ,t)
⋃
Bi,t,
where Bi,t denotes the set of bucket IDs of Ei,t. In addition,
si also calculates Hi,t = hashKi,t(
∑χ
ρ=1Hjρ,t + Hi,t) and
Pi,t =
∏χ
ρ=1 Pjρ,t · Pi,t, ρ ∈ [1, χ]. Finally, si reports
〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t〉 to its parent node on the aggregation
tree. Note that, if si is a leaf node on the aggregation tree,
then we assume that it receives 〈∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, 0, 1〉.
Assume that the set {pVM, p∅M|V ∈ V} of wd + 1 prime
numbers stored in M are all different from those stored in
sensor nodes, and the set {kVM,0, k∅M,0|V ∈ V} of wd + 1
bucket keys are selected by the authority and stored in M. M
computes kVM,t = hash(kVM,t−1) and drops kVM,t−1 at epoch
t. In addition, M also computes k∅M,t = hash(k∅M,t−1) and
drops k∅M,t−1 at epoch t. For the storage node M, it can also
calculate EM,t, BM,t, HM,t, and PM,t according to the its
own sensed data at epoch t. In fact, the proceduresM needs to
perform after messages are received from the child nodes are
the same as the ones performed by the sensor nodes. Acting
as the root of the aggregation tree, however, M keeps the
aggregated results, which are denoted as EM,t,BM,t,HM,t
and PM,t, respectively, in its local storage and waits for the
query issued by the authority. Note that PM,t can be thought
of as a compact summary of the sensed data of the whole
network and can be very useful for the authority in checking
the completeness of the query-result, while HM,t can be used
by the authority to verify the authenticity of PM,t.
Assume that a range query 〈C, t, l1, h1, l2, h2, . . . , ld, hd〉
is issued by the authority. The encrypted data falling into
the buckets in the set A, along with the proof composed
of HM,t and PM,t, are sent to the authority. Once PM,t
is received, the authority immediately performs the prime
factor decomposition of PM,t. Due to the construction of
{pVi , pVM, p∅i , p∅M|i ∈ [1, N − 1], V ∈ V}, which guarantees
that the bucket primes are all distinct, after the prime factor
decomposition of PM,t, the authority can be aware of which
node contributes which data within specified buckets. As a
result, the authority can know which keys should be used to
verify the authenticity and integrity of HM,t. More specifi-
cally, assume that PM,t = (p1)a1 · · · (pγ)aγ , a1, . . . , aγ > 0,
γ ≥ 0, and that p1, . . . , pγ are distinct prime numbers. From
the construction of PM,t, we know that (pkˆ)
a
kˆ , for kˆ ∈ [1, γ],
is equal to (pk′′k′ )akˆ , for k′ ∈ [1, N − 1] and k′′ ∈ V . From
the procedure performed by each node, it can also be known
that the appearance of (pkˆ)
a
kˆ = (pk
′′
k′ )
a
kˆ in PM,t means that
at epoch t the sensor node sk′ produces akˆ data falling into
bucket k′′, contributing the bucket key kk′′k′,t in total akˆ times in
HM,t. Here, the sensor node sk′ producing the data falling into
the bucket ∅ means that sk′ senses nothing. Thus, we can infer
the total amount of data falling into specified buckets at epoch
t. Recall that the authority is aware of the topology of the
aggregation tree. Thus, after the prime factor decomposition
of PM,t, the authority can reconstruct HM,t according to the
derived akˆ’s and pkˆ’s by its own effort, because it knows Ki,t
and kVi,t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N−1,M}, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀V ∈ V . Therefore,
we know that the HM,t reconstructed by the authority is equal
to the received HM,t if and only if the received PM,t are
considered authentic. When the verification of PM,t fails, M
is considered compromised. When the verification of PM,t is
successful, the authority decrypts all the received encryptions,
and checks whether the number of query-results falling into
the buckets in A matches those indicated by PM,t. If and
only if there are matches in all the buckets in A, the received
query-results are considered complete.
B. Securing Top-k Queries (STQ)
Basically, the proposed STQ scheme for securing top-k
query is built upon SRQ in that both confidentiality-preserving
5reporting and query-result completeness verification phases in
SRQ are exploited. In particular, based on the proof generated
in SRQ, since it can know which buckets contain data, the
authority can also utilize such information to examine the
completeness of query-results of top-k query. In other words,
top-k query can be secured by the use of the SRQ scheme.
Because of the similarity between the SRQ and STQ schemes,
some details of the STQ scheme will be omitted in the
following description.
Here, a bucket data set is defined to be composed of
bucket IDs. We use a d-dimensional tuple, (v1, . . . , vd), where
vg ∈ [1, w], to represent the bucket IDs in a bucket data
set. With this representation, we can use the ranking func-
tion, R, to calculate the ranking value of each bucket ID.
Assume that the ν-th interval in the g-th attribute contains
the values in [uℓg,ν , uhg,ν]. The ranking value of the bucket ID,
(v1, . . . , vd), is evaluated as R(
uℓ
1,v1
+uh
1,v1
2 , . . . ,
uℓd,vd
+uhd,vd
2 ),
where the d-dimensional tuple, (u
ℓ
1,v1
+uh
1,v1
2 , . . . ,
uℓd,vd
+uhd,vd
2 ),
whose individual entry is simply averaged over the minimum
and maximum values in each interval, acts as the representative
of the bucket (v1, . . . , vd) for simplicity.
Recall that we simply assume that the data with the first
k smallest ranking values are desired. The general form of
the message sent from si to its parent node at the end of
epoch t is 〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t〉, where Ei,t, Bi,t, Hi,t,
and Pi,t are the same as those defined in SRQ. Assume that
ζ1, . . . , ζk ∈ V are k bucket IDs in the bucket data set whose
ranking values are among the first k smallest ones. According
to BM,t, M can calculate the ranking values of bucket IDs
in BM,t and, therefore, knows ζ1, . . . , ζk. To answer a top-k
query, 〈C, t, k〉, the storage node M reports the bucket IDs,
ζ1, . . . , ζk, and their corresponding encrypted data, along with
HM,t and PM,t, to the authority because it can be known that
the data with the first k smallest ranking values must be within
ζ1, . . . , ζk. After receiving the query-result, the authority can
first verify the authenticity of Pi,t by using Hi,t, and verify the
query-result completeness by using Pi,t. Note that both of the
above verifications can be performed in a way similar to the
one described in Sec. III-A. Actually, after receiving Pi,t, the
authority knows which buckets contain data and the amount of
data. Hence, knowing uℓg,ν and uhg,ν , ∀g ∈ [1, d], ∀ν ∈ [1, w],
the authority can also obtain ζ1, . . . , ζk. Afterwards, what the
authority should do is to check if it receives the bucket IDs,
ζ1, . . . , ζk, and if the number of data in bucket ζg′ , g′ ∈ [1, k],
is consistent with the number indicated by Pi,t. If and only
if these two verifications pass, the authority considers the
received query-result to be complete and extracts the top-k
result from the encrypted data sent from M.
C. Securing Skyline Queries (SSQ)
To support secure skyline query in sensor networks, in the
following we first present a naive approach as baseline, and
then propose an advanced approach that employs a grouping
technique for simultaneously reducing the computation and
communication cost.
1) Baseline scheme: To ensure the data confidentiality and
authenticity, as in the SRQ and STQ schemes, the sensed data
are also encrypted by using the bucket scheme mentioned in
Sec. III-A1. At the end of epoch t, each si broadcasts its
sensor ID, all the sensed data encrypted by key Ki,t, and
the proper bucket IDs to all the nodes within the same cell.
Then, according to the broadcast messages, each sensor node
si at epoch t has a bucket data set composed of the bucket
IDs extracted from broadcast messages and the bucket IDs
corresponding to its own sensed data. In fact, the bucket data
sets constructed by different nodes in the same cell at epoch
t will be the same. Treating these bucket IDs as data points,
si can find the set Φt of skyline buckets that are defined as
the bucket IDs not dominated by the other bucket IDs. Here,
since the bucket IDs are represented also by d-dimensional
tuples, the notion of domination is the same as the one defined
in the query model of Sec. II. Define quasi-skyline data as
the set of data falling into the skyline buckets. It can be
observed that the set of skyline data must be a subset of quasi-
skyline data. After doing so, each node can locally find2 the
quasi-skyline data, although there could be the cases where
superfluous data are also included. At the end of epoch t, if
Ki,t is smaller than a pre-determined threshold, then si sends
its sensor ID and hashKi,t(Φt) to M. Here, hashKi,t(Φt)
works as a kind of proof so that it can be used for checking
the query-result completeness. Note that only hashKi,t(Φt)
needs to be transmitted to M because M also receives all the
encrypted data and bucket IDs, and can calculate the quasi-
skyline data by itself after message broadcasting.
To answer the skyline query 〈C, t〉 the storage node reports
the quasi-skyline data calculated at epoch t and the hash values
received at epoch t to the the authority. Since the authority
knows the threshold and Ki,0 ∀i ∈ [1, N ], it will expect to
receive hash values from a set of sensor nodes whose keys are
smaller than the threshold. Unfortunately, due to the network-
wide broadcast, this baseline scheme works but is inefficient
in terms of communication overhead. Hence, an efficient SSQ
scheme exploiting a grouping strategy is proposed as follows.
2) Grouping technique: Like the baseline scheme, the
bucket scheme mentioned in Sec. III-A1 is also used. Given
a data set O and a collection {O1, · · · ,Oτ} of subsets of O
satisfying
⋃τ
j=1Oj = O and Oj ∩ Oj′ = ∅, ∀j 6= j′ for
τ ≥ 1. An observation is that the skyline data of O must be
a subset of the union of the skyline data of Oj , ∀j ∈ [1, τ ].
Thus, the key idea of our proposed SSQ scheme is to partition
the sensor nodes in a cell into groups so that broadcasting can
be limited within a group, resulting in reduced computation
and communication costs. In what follows, the SSQ scheme
will be described in more detail.
The sensor nodes in a cell are divided into µ disjoint
groups, Gη , ∀η ∈ [1, µ], each of which is composed of |Gη|
2The design of an algorithm for efficiently finding the skyline data given a
data set is a research topic, but is beyond the scope of this paper. We consider
the naive data-wise comparison-based algorithm with running time O(n2) if
the size of the data set is n, but each node, in fact, can implement an arbitrary
algorithm for finding skyline data in our setting.
6sensor nodes. The grouping needs to be performed only once
right after the sensor deployment. Note that each group is
formed by nearby sensor nodes and the grouping procedure
is independent of the structure of the aggregation tree without
affecting SRQ and STQ. Let cell-region be part of the sensing
region monitored by one specified cell. For example, with the
assumption that the shape of each cell-region is approximately
a square, as shown in Fig. 1, and sensor nodes with uniform
deployment are considered, the grouping can be achieved by
simply dividing a cell-region into µ (= √N ) sub-cell-regions.
The sensor nodes in the same sub-cell-region form a group.
Note that the square cell-region is assumed here for ease of
explanation, but is not necessary for the grouping procedures3.
At the end of epoch t, each sensor node si broadcasts its
sensor ID, its order seed θi,t = hashKi,t(i), all the sensed data
encrypted with the key Ki,t, and the proper bucket IDs to all
the nodes within the same group. After doing so, as in baseline
scheme, the sensor nodes in the same group can locally find
the quasi-skyline data from the bucket data set whose entries
are generated by the sensor nodes in the same group. Let Φη,t
be the set of skyline bucket IDs and φη,t their corresponding
quasi-skyline data encrypted by the sensor nodes in group η
using proper keys at epoch t. At the end of epoch t, if θi,t
is among the first ξ1 smallest ones in the set of order seeds
in group η at epoch t, where ξ1 is a pre-determined threshold
known by each node, then si reports Φη,t, φη,t, its verification
seed hashKi,t(Φη,t), and the IDs of sensor nodes generating
φη,t to M. In fact, ξ1 = 1 is sufficient for the verification
purpose. ξ1, however, is also related to the resiliency against
sensor node compromises. Thus, we still keep ξ1 as a variable
and defer the explanation of the purpose of ξ1 to Sec. V.
Here, the purpose of verification seeds is that the completeness
of quasi-skyline data can be guaranteed by exactly ξ1 sensor
nodes for each group, while the purpose of order seed is to
guarantee that at each epoch exactly ξ1 sensor nodes will send
the verification seeds as the proofs.
To answer a skyline query, 〈C, t〉, the storage node M
reports a hash of all the received verification seeds, ht =
hash(||i∈ΓthashKi,t(Φi,t)), where || denotes the bit-string
concatenation and Γt is the set of sensor nodes responsible
for sending a hash value to M in each group at epoch t, the
set of skyline bucket IDs, and their corresponding encrypted
data received at epoch t to the authority. Since it knows the
threshold ξ1 and Ki,t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1,M}, the authority
will expect to receive a particular hash value from M. If
and only if the hash sent from the M matches the hash of
the verification seeds calculated according to the knowledge
of Γt and Ki,t by the authority itself, the received data are
considered complete, and contain the skyline data.
3For example, the authority knowing the position of each node or the use of
clustering algorithms can also divide nodes into groups. In general, after the
localization, each sensor node can join the proper group possibly according
to its geographic position when the grouping information such as the sizes of
sensing region and cell-region are preloaded in sensor nodes.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We will focus on analyzing the critical issue of detecting
an incomplete query-result in tiered networks. In this section,
the detection probability and communication cost of query-
result completeness verification in the proposed schemes will
be analyzed. It is assumed that the number of hops between
M and each sensor node is √n for a collection of n uniformly
deployed nodes [1]. In this section, both detection probability
and communication cost are discussed at a fixed epoch t.
As the communication cost of encoding approach [23]
grows exponentially with the number of attributes, and some
crosscheck approaches [31], [40] have relatively low detection
probability, in the following, we compare SRQ with only
hybrid crosscheck [40], which achieves the best balance be-
tween the detection probability and communication cost in the
literature. Note that, the parameter setting required in hybrid
crosscheck is the same as that listed in [40].
A. Detection Probability
The detection probability is defined as the probability that
the compromised storage node M is detected if it returns
an incomplete query-result. With the fact that the larger the
portion of query-result M drops, higher the probability that
the authority detects it, we consider the worst case that only
one bucket and its corresponding data in the query-result are
dropped by M and the number of data sensed by a node is
either 0 or 1 as the lower bound of detection probability.
1) Detection probability for SRQ and STQ: To return an
incomplete query-result without being detected by the author-
ity, M should create a proof, 〈ĤM,t, P̂M,t〉, corresponding
to the incomplete query-result. Since bucket primes can be
known by the adversary, P̂M,t can be easily constructed.
Nevertheless, ĤM,t cannot be constructed, since the bucket
keys of sensor nodes generating the bucket dropped by M are
not known by the adversary. Therefore, only two options can
be chosen by the adversary. First, the adversary can directly
guess to obtain ĤM,t, with probability being 2−ℓh , where ℓh
is the number of bits output by a keyed hash function. This
implies that the detection probability PSRQdet,1 is 1 − 2−ℓh for
the first case. Second, knowing the aggregation tree topology,
the adversary can also follow the rule of SRQ to construct the
ĤM,t without considering the bucket key of dropped bucket.
Assume that the probability that a sensor node has sensed
data is δ. The size of the bucket key pool can be derived as
(N−2)(2δ+1−δ)+2 = Nδ+N−2δ. Thus, the probability
for the adversary to guess successfully is 2−ℓk(Nδ+N−2δ),
where ℓk is the number of bits of a key, leading to the
detection probability PSRQdet,2 is 1 − 2−ℓk(Nδ+N−2δ) for the
second case. Overall, the final detection probability, PSRQdet ,
is min{PSRQdet,1,PSRQdet,2}. On the other hand, as stated in Sec.
III-B, the STQ scheme is built upon the SRQ scheme. Thus,
the detection probability, PSTQdet , will be the same as P
SRQ
det .
As Fig. 2 depicts, the detection probability of SRQ is close
to 1 in any case. However, hybrid crosscheck is effective only
when a few sensed data are generated in the network. Such
7a performance difference can be attributed to the fact that the
sensed data in the network are securely and deterministically
summarized in the proof of SRQ but they are probabilistically
summarized in hybrid crosscheck.
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Fig. 2: The detection probability of SRQ and hybrid crosscheck in the cases that (a)
Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
2) Detection probability for SSQ: To return an incom-
plete query-result without being detected by the authority,
M should forge a proof, i.e., a hash ĥt of all the received
verification seeds, corresponding to the incomplete query-
result. Therefore, only two options can be chosen by the
adversary. First, the adversary can directly guess a hash value
ĥt. The probability for the adversary to guess successfully is
2−ℓh , implying the detection probability PSSQdet,1 is 1 − 2−ℓh
in this case. Second, the adversary can also follow the rule
of SRQ to construct ĥt for incomplete data. In this case, the
adversary is forced to guess ξ1 keys for each one of µ groups,
leading to the probability of success guess being 2−ℓkµξ1 and
the detection probability being PSSQdet,2 = 1 − 2−ℓkµξ1 . The
final detection probability, PSSQdet , is thus, min{PSSQdet,1,PSSQdet,2}.
Obviously, PSSQdet will also be close to 1 when appropriate key
length or hash function is selected.
B. Communication Cost
The communication cost, T, is defined as the number of bits
in the communications required for the proposed schemes. We
are mainly interested in the asymptotic result in terms of d
and N because they reflect the scalability of the number of
attributes and the network size, respectively. We do not count
the number of bits in representing data, Ei,t, since the sending
of Ei,t is necessary in any data collection scheme. We further
assume that there are on average pdtobY data buckets, where
0 ≤ pdtob ≤ 1, generated in cell C.
1) Communication Cost of SRQ and STQ: Each sensor
node si in SRQ is required to send Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t to
its parent node. Nevertheless, Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t can be
aggregated along the path in the aggregation tree. As a con-
sequence, si actually has only one-hop broadcast containing
Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t once at each epoch. In addition, to answer
a range query, M is responsible for sending HM,t, PM,t,
and the bucket IDs in A. In summary, the communication
cost, TSRQ, can be calculated as (N − 1)(ℓh + ℓP ) +
pdtobY ⌈logw⌉d logN + ℓh + ℓP + |A|⌈logw⌉d = O(N +
d logN), where ℓP is the number of bits used to represent the
bucket prime PM,t. Due to the similarity between SRQ and
STQ, the communication cost, TSTQ, can also be calculated
as O(N + d logN) in a way similar to the one for obtaining
T
SRQ
.
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Fig. 3: The communication cost of SRQ and hybrid crosscheck in the cases that (a)
Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
As shown in Fig. 3 where the parameters ℓh = 80 and
ℓP = 1000 are used, the communication cost of SRQ
is significantly lower than that of hybrid crosscheck. More
specifically, as the communication cost of hybrid crosscheck
can be asymptotically represented as O(N2+Nd) and will be
drastically increased with N and d, the proposed SRQ scheme,
however, exhibits low communication cost regardless of the
amount of sensed data in the network due to the fact that the
size of the proof used in SRQ is always a constant. Hence,
the communication cost of SRQ will be dominated by the
aggregation procedure, the average hop distance between M
and each node, and the transmission of bucket IDs, resulting
O(N + d logN) communication cost.
2) Communication Cost of SSQ: Since grouping is only
performed once after sensor deployment, we ignore its com-
munication cost. Note that, in the following, the communica-
tion cost of the data should be counted because it is involved
in the design of SSQ. After the grouping, each si broadcasts
8the data bucket IDs, sensor ID, and the order seed to all the
nodes within the same group. Assuming that the nodes employ
a duplicate suppression algorithm, by which each node only
broadcasts a given message once, one node should broadcast
a message with YN ℓd +
pdtobY
N ⌈logw⌉d+ ℓid + ℓh bits, where
ℓd is the average size of a datum and ℓid is the number of bits
required to represent sensor IDs, resulting in communication
cost of C1 = |Gη|2( YN ℓd + pdtobYN ⌈logw⌉d + ℓid + ℓh) bits
in each group. Let 0 ≤ pq ≤ 1 be the average ratio of
the quasi-skyline data to all the sensed data. |Φη,t| is equal
to pdtobpqY on average. Then, once the the order seed is
among the first ξ1 smallest ones of the order seeds in a group,
si ∈ Gη is required for sending Φη,t, φη,t, hashKi,t(Φη,t),
its sensor ID, and the IDs of sensor nodes generating buckets
in Φη,t to M, implying the communication cost of C2 =
pdtobpqY ⌈logw⌉d+pqY ℓd+ℓh+ℓid+|Gη|ℓid bits in the worst
case. Note that the verification seeds cannot be aggregated,
although the verification seed can also be delivered along the
path to M on the aggregation tree. M needs to send the
skyline bucket IDs, its sensor ID, and a hash ht as the proof to
the authority for answering the query. The communication cost
of M is C3 = ℓid+ ℓh+µ
∑µ
η=1 pdtobpqY ⌈logw⌉d+pqY ℓd.
Consequently, the upper bound of communication cost, TSSQ,
can be obtained as µC1+µξ1C2 logN +C3 = O(N
3
2 +Nd)
when µ =
√
N and |Gη| =
√
N , ∀η ∈ [1, µ]. By similar
derivation, the communication cost of the baseline scheme is
O(N2d). Thus, exploiting the proposed grouping technique
does reduce the required communication cost. The trends of
communication cost in SSQ are shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: The communication cost of SSQ for (a) Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
V. IMPACT OF SENSOR NODE COMPROMISE
In the previous discussions, we have ignored the impact of
the compromise of sensor nodes. In practice, the adversary
could take the control of sensor nodes to enhance the ability
of performing malicious operations. The notation s is used
to denote a set of random sensor nodes compromised by
the adversary. In collusion attack considered here, M col-
ludes with s in the hope that more portions of query-results
generated by innocent sensor nodes can be dropped. Since
crosscheck approaches [40] suffer from collusion attacks, the
impact of collusion attack on secure range query for tiered
sensor networks was addressed in [40]. Their proposed method
is random probing, by which the authority occasionally checks
if there is no data sensed by some randomly selected sensor
nodes by directly communicating with them. Random probing,
however, can only discover the incomplete query-results with
an inefficient but possibly lucky way and cannot identify s.
On the other hand, in this paper, we identify a new Denial-
of-Service attack never addressed in the literature, called false-
incrimination attack, by which s provides false sub-proofs to
the innocent storage node so that the innocent storage node
will be regarded as the compromised one and be revoked.
Unfortunately, all the prior works [23], [31], [40] suffer from
this attack. In summary, with minor modifications involved,
our proposed SRQ, STQ, and SSQ schemes are resilient
against both the collusion attack and false-incrimination attack.
It should be especially noted that, in the following discus-
sion of SRQ, we temporarily make two unrealistic assumptions
that the compromised nodes can only disobey the procedures
of the proposed schemes4 and the (subtree) proofs (defined
later) will not be manipulated by the compromised storage
and sensor nodes, in order to emphasize on the effectiveness
of our proposed technique in identifying compromised nodes.
Nevertheless, these two assumptions will be relaxed later.
Impact of Sensor Node Compromise on SRQ and STQ.
Under the above two assumptions, the SRQ scheme is in-
herently resilient against collusion attack, because, regardless
of the existence and position of s, the proper bucket keys
will be embedded into the proofs and cannot be removed
by s. Nevertheless, SRQ could be vulnerable to the false-
incrimination attack since false sub-proofs injected by s will
be integrated with the other correct sub-proofs to construct
a false proof, leading to the revocation of innocent M. Here,
we present a novel technique called subtree sampling enabling
SRQ, with a slight modification, to efficiently mitigate the
threat of false-incrimination attacks. The idea of subtree
sampling is to check if the proof constructed by the nodes
in a random subtree with fixed depth is authentic so as
to perform the attestation only on the remaining suspicious
nodes. Let m be a user-selected constant indicating the
subtree depth. In the modified SRQ scheme, once receiving
〈jρ, t, Ejρ,t,Bjρ,t,Hjρ,t,Pjρ,t, ϑ0jρ,t, . . . , ϑm−1jρ,t 〉, jρ ∈ [1, N −
1], ∀ρ ∈ [1, χ], from its χ children, sj1 , . . . , sjχ , each si
calculates Ejρ,t, Bjρ,t, Hjρ,t, and Pjρ,t as in the original SRQ
scheme. Note that, if si is a leaf node on the aggregation
tree, it is assumed that si receives 〈∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, 0, 1, ∅, . . . , ∅〉. In
the modified SRQ scheme, however, si additionally performs
4In other words, compromised nodes are assumed to not inject bogus sensor
readings. They can only manipulate its own subproof and the proofs sent from
its descendant sensor nodes.
9the following operations. Assume that H¯υjρ,t, P¯
υ
jρ,t ∈ ϑυjρ,t,∀υ ∈ [0,m − 1], ∀jρ ∈ [1, N − 1], and ∀ρ ∈ [1, χ]. si
calculates H¯υi,t = hashKi,t(
∑χ
ρ=1 H¯
υ−1
jρ,t
+ Hi,t) and P¯ υi,t =∏χ
ρ=1 P¯
υ−1
jρ,t
· Pi,t, ∀υ ∈ [1,m]. si also calculates H¯0i,t = Hi,t
and P¯ 0i,t = Pi,t, where Hi,t and Pi,t are computed in a way
stated in Sec. III-A. Then, H¯υi,t and P¯ υi,t are assigned to set
ϑυi,t, ∀υ ∈ [0,m − 1]. If hashKi,t(i) ≤ ξ2, where ξ2 is a
pre-determined threshold known by each node and will be
analyzed later, then si sends ϑmi,t to (possibly compromised)
M. Let Tmi be a subtree of the underlying aggregation tree,
rooted at si with depth m. ϑmi,t generated by si can be thought
of as the subtree proof of the data sensed by the nodes in Tmi .
Finally, si sends 〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t, ϑ0i,t, . . . , ϑm−1i,t 〉 to
its parent node. Let Wt be the witness set of sensor nodes
satisfying hashKi,t(i) ≤ ξ2 at epoch t. The nodes in Wt are
called witness nodes at epoch t.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: The conceptual diagrams of identifying the compromised nodes. (a) Only the
nodes in red area need to be attested. (b) Only the nodes in gray area need to be attested.
We first consider the simplest case, where no compromised
nodes act as the witness nodes. We further assume that only
one compromised node (i.e., |s| = 1) injects false sub-proof
for simplicity and our method can be adapted to the case of
multiple compromised nodes injecting false sub-proofs. We
have the following observation regarding each witness node si
and its generated ϑmi,t. Assume that the query-result is found to
be incomplete at epoch t. The authority requests ϑmi,t for each
witness node si stored in M. To identify the compromised
nodes, all the nodes at first are considered neutral. The nodes
in Tmi become innocent if the verification of ϑmi,t passes, and
the nodes in Tmi become suspicious otherwise5. The above
verification is performed as follows. According to the P¯mi,t in
the subtree proof ϑmi,t, the authority knows which nodes in the
subtree Tmi contribute data and their amount. The authority
5Note that there would be the cases that a node is deemed to be both
innocent and suspicious when different subtree proofs are considered. When
such a case happens, that node obviously should be innocent.
can, based on this information, calculate H¯mi,t by itself. Define
ETm
i
,t as the set of data sensed by the nodes in Tmi , and BTmi ,t
as the corresponding bucket IDs of ETmi ,t. As a consequence,
the verification passes if and only if the H¯i,t calculated by
the authority itself is equal to the H¯i,t extracted from the
received received ϑmi,t, and the amount of the data in ETmi ,t
falling into the specified buckets in BTm
i
,t matches the one
indicated in P¯i,t. As a whole, each time the above checking
procedures are performed according to ϑmi,t at epoch t, nodes
will be partitioned into three sets, innocent set Iit, neutral
set, and suspicious set Sit containing innocent nodes, neutral
nodes, and suspicious nodes, respectively. We can conclude
that (
⋂
i∈Wt,Sit 6=∅
Sit)
⋃{M} contains at least one compro-
mised node injecting the false subproof if at least one Sit is
nonempty and ({s1, . . . , sN−1}\(
⋃
i∈Wt
Iit))
⋃{M} contains
at least one compromised node injecting the false subproof
otherwise. In more details, the authority at first only performs
the attestation [25], [26], [28] on the nodes in ⋂i∈Wt,Sit 6=∅Sit
or in {s1, . . . , sN−1} \ (
⋃
i∈Wt
Iit). Nonetheless, after the
attestation, if the nodes being attested are ensured to be not
compromised, then M should be the compromised node. It
can be observed that the size of the set of the nodes the
authority needs to perform the attestation has possibility of
being drastically shrunk so that the computation and commu-
nication cost required in the attestation will be substantially
reduced as well. It can also be observed that each time the
attestation is performed, at least one compromised node can
be recovered. The intuition behind the checking procedure can
be illustrated in Fig. 5. In addition, Fig. 6 depicts the number
of nodes to be attested after an incomplete reply is found
in different settings. Since the number of witness nodes is
approximately ξ2(N − 1)/2ℓh , it can be observed from Fig. 6
that the larger the ξ2 and m, the lower the number of nodes
to be attested. Nevertheless, when ξ2 and m become larger,
the communication cost of the modified SRQ scheme, which
will be presented later, is increased as well.
There, however, would still be the cases where the compro-
mised nodes luckily act as witness nodes so that they can be
considered innocent by sending genuine subtree proof to M.
In our consideration, this case does happen, but our technique
also successfully mitigates the threat of false-incrimination
attacks because the effectiveness of false-incrimination attacks
is now limited within the case where some compromised nodes
work as witness nodes.
Now, we have to remove the two unrealistic assumptions we
made before, allowing that the bogus data can be injected and
the subtree proof sent from the witness node has possibility
to be maliciously altered on its way to the authority. After
the removal of these two unrealistic assumptions, SRQ is
still resilient against collusion attacks because the use of
the proofs guarantees that the misbehavior of deleting the
sensed data will be detected. Unfortunately, on the one hand,
the compromised nodes injecting the bogus data can deceive
the authority into accepting the falsified sensor reading. On
the other hand, the compromised nodes lying on the path
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Fig. 6: The number of nodes to be attested for (a) N = 500 and (b) N = 1000.
between M and witness nodes can manipulate the subtree
proofs so that the compromised nodes can avoid the detection
and the innocent M can still be falsely incriminated. In our
strategy, we use the redundancy property, which have been
widely used in the design of the other security protocols in
WSNs such as en-route filtering [34], [35], [37], [39], to
mitigate the former threat, while we, motivated by the IP
traceback technique in internet security literature, develop a
new traceback technique suitable for WSNs to resist against
the latter attack. Here, the redundancy property means that
usually WSNs are densely deployed so that an event in the
sensing region can be simultaneously detected by multiple
nodes. In general, the redundancy property can be obtained
by achieving the so-called t-coverage [10], [18], [32] and
therefore, an event can be simultaneously observed by at least
t nodes. In the following description of our remedy to these
problems, due to its similarity to our modified SRQ scheme
previously mentioned, we will omit some notational details,
stressing on the procedures itself.
When the redundancy property is used, in essence, our
SRQ does not need to be changed. Assume for now that, the
authority issues a range query and receives the query-result
from M. In addition, we also assume that all the checking
procedures stated in (modified) SRQ are passed. The authority
now wants to know whether the received data are falsified by
and sent from the compromised nodes. Recall that each node
can be aware of its geographic position. After knowing which
nodes contribute the sensed data to its issued query from the
query-result, the authority further acquires the encrypted data
of the neighbors of those nodes from M. Note that this can
be achieved because when geographic positions of all nodes
are known by the authority6, inferring the one-hop neighbors
of a specific node can be easily achieved. Finally, for each
node in the query-result, the authority checks the consistency
of its sensor reading and the sensor readings of its one-hop
neighbors. The sensed data will be rejected as long as it is
inconsistent with the sensor readings of its neighbors. The
consistency checking procedure here may allow for certain
measurement errors or environmental factors, which should
be domain-specific and user-defined.
Now, we turn to address another problem that the subtree
proofs transmitted from the witness node to the authority
could be maliciously altered by the compromised (storage
or sensor) nodes. To deal with this kind of threat, we need
a mechanism, by which the receiver not only can know
whether the received message is modified by the intermediate
nodes, but also can point out the node modifying the message
if it does exist. Motivated by the IP traceback techniques,
we develop a recursive traceback mechanism. To be more
specifically, each node si on the path connecting the M and
the witness node, after receiving D, where D denotes the
subtree proof, from its descendant node, attaches hashKi,t(D)
to D and then forwards D||hashKi,t(D) to its ascendant node
on the underlying aggregation tree. Note that it is assumed that
the witness node receives D||∅. Thus, with this modification, a
subtree proof received by the authority should be accompanied
with ψ hashes, where ψ is the number of nodes (including
storage nodes and the witness node itself) between a specific
witness node and the authority. Here, we should note that
because the topology of the aggregation tree is known by
the authority, when the subtree proof is sent, the IDs of
intermediate nodes except for the ID of the witness node
itself do not need to be attached7. Hence, when the query-
result is deemed incomplete, before conducting the procedures
defined in the subtree sampling technique to attest nodes,
the authority checks whether the received subtree proof is
maliciously altered by the intermediate node. In particular,
assume that the subtree proof and its ψ associated hashes,
D||hD1 || · · · ||hDψ , where hDi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ψ, is the hash calculated
by the node that is (i − 1)-hop away from the witness node
and hD1 is computed by the witness node itself according to
its asserted subtree proof, are received by the authority. After
the reception of D||hD1 || · · · ||hDψ , the authority checks the
consistency of the hash backward; i.e., it first checks hDψ , and
then hDψ−1, and so on. If such a verification can be successfully
proceeded all ψ hashes, then the subtree proof D is considered
to be intact. Otherwise, once the verification fails in, say, hDj ,
we can conclude that the subtree proof was altered by the
corresponding node since the innocent node is not assumed to
behave in such a way.
6As long as each node knows its position, it sends in a multihop manner
its position to the authority with the MAC constructed by the key uniquely
shared with the authority. This kind of operations are only performed once
after the sensor deployment.
7The path from any sensor node in the aggregation tree to M is unique.
The authority can infer the nodes the subtree proof traverses once it is aware
of the ID of the witness node.
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Recall that the communication cost of original SRQ is
O(N + d logN). In the modified SRQ without those two
unrealistic assumptions, each node si at epoch t is required
to additionally send ϑ0i,t, . . . , ϑm−1i,t , leading to O(N) com-
munication cost. At epoch t, approximately ξ2(N − 1)/2ℓh
witness nodes will send their subtree proofs to M. Never-
theless, when the subtree proofs are sent to M, since the
additional hashes will be added, its communication cost will
be O(N · (√N + (√N − 1) + · · · + 1)). As a result, the
communication cost becomes O(N2 + d logN).
Basically, STQ can be regarded as a special use of SRQ.
Thus, its resiliency against false-incrimination attack is the
same as that of SRQ. Nevertheless, due to the nature of top-
k query, the injection of the falsified sensor reading from
the compromised nodes will imply a significant query-result
deviation. Nevertheless, due to the use of the redundancy
property in resisting against false data injection, STQ is
resilient against the collusion attacks and false-incrimination
attacks even when the compromised nodes can inject bogus
data and can manipulate the proofs. Finally, because of its
similarity to the SRQ scheme, STQ has the communication
overhead the same as SRQ’s.
Impact of Sensor Node Compromise on SSQ. Recall
that two aforementioned unrealistic assumptions are made. We
first consider the resiliency against false-incrimination attacks.
The simplest method is to introduce a parameter ξ3 ≤ ξ1
so that M reports to the authority all the verification seeds,
instead of the hash of them in original SSQ. After that, for
each group, if at least ξ3 out of ξ1 verification seeds can
be successfully verified, then the quasi-skyline data in that
group are considered complete. Hence, the threat of false-
incrimination attacks will be mitigated because the adversary
is forced to send at least ξ1 − ξ3 + 1 false proofs, instead of
single one false proof. With even one verification seed from
a specific group failed to be verified, we can conclude that at
least one compromised sensor node exists in that group.
Now, we consider collusion attacks. In SSQ, both M
and sensor nodes only know the quasi-skyline data. Recall
that quasi-skyline data are not necessarily the skyline data.
Thus, even when there is more than one compromised sensor
node in a group, the probability of successfully dropping the
skyline data is actually small. More specifically, to drop the
skyline data at a specified epoch, s should contain at least ξ3
sensor nodes responsible for sending hash values in order to
successfully forge a proof of incomplete quasi-skyline data,
and at the same time should be fortunate enough to select
groups whose quasi-skyline data contain skyline data8.
Now, we consider both the collusion and false-incrimination
attacks. To drop the skyline data, the only thing M can do
is to drop the data of certain groups. Here, for simplicity, we
consider the case where M drops the data of a fixed group Gη,
η ∈ [1, µ], in which a set s of x sensor nodes is compromised.
To prevent the detection of incomplete query-result, ξ3 out of x
8Definitely, M can simply drop all the sensed data. Nevertheless, under
this option, it is forced to forge at least µ(ξ1 − ξ3 + 1) proofs (µ =
√
N in
our analysis), leading to high probability of being detected.
compromised sensor nodes should be the sensor nodes respon-
sible for sending the proofs. The probability that at least ξ3 out
of ξ1 nodes responsible for sending the proofs are contained
in s is p1 =
∑ξ1
j=ξ3
(
ξ1
j
)(
|Gη|−ξ1
x−j
)
/
(
|Gη|
x
)
. In other words,
this is equal to the probability that the compromised sensor
nodes can drop the quasi-skyline data without being detected.
Quasi-skyline data, however, are not necessarily equivalent to
the skyline data. The probability that the quasi-skyline data
dropped by compromised nodes indeed contain skyline data
can be represented as p2 =
(
Y−pcY
|Gη|Y/N−pcY
)
/
(
Y
|Gη|Y/N
)
, where
pc is the average ratio of the skyline data to all the sensed data.
In short, this is equal to the probability that the operations per-
formed by compromised nodes cause the loss of skyline data.
As a whole, even if the adversary has x compromised nodes in
Gη, the probability of successfully making skyline query-result
incomplete is merely p1 · p2. The trends of such a probability
are depicted in Fig. 7 under different parameter settings. As
shown in Fig. 7a, p1 · p2 is decreased with an increase of
N and Y . This is because when N and Y become larger, it
is more unlikely that the quasi-skyline data dropped by the
adversary contains the skyline data. Nevertheless, as shown in
Fig. 7b, p1 ·p2 is increased with an increase of (ξ1− ξ3). This
is because when (ξ1 − ξ3) becomes larger, it is more likely
that s can forge a proof of an incomplete quasi-skyline data.
As a whole, from the false-incrimination attack point of view,
the larger the (ξ1 − ξ3), the lower the p1 · p2, but from the
collusion attack point of view, the smaller the (ξ1 − ξ3), the
lower the p1 · p2. This would be an optimization problem that
deserves further studying. In addition, compared with original
SSQ, the additional communication cost incurred from the
modified SSQ comes from the transmission of verification
seeds from M to the authority. Thus, the communication cost
of the modified SSQ scheme remains O(N 32 +Nd).
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Fig. 7: The probability of successfully dropping skyline data in the cases that (a)
ξ1 = 8 and ξ3 = 4, and (b) N = 500 and Y = 100.
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Now, the two unrealistic assumptions will be relaxed so that
the compromised nodes can provide falsified sensor readings
and contaminate the proofs. The same as the top-k query,
skyline query is vulnerable to the falsified data. That is,
a compromised node injecting an falsified extreme sensor
reading can gain the effect of deleting all the data sensed by
the other sensor nodes. Thus, the redundancy property is sill
required to be applied on our SSQ scheme so as to detect
the false data injection. Because the use of the redundancy
property in SSQ is also similar to its use in SRQ, we omit
the detailed description as well. In addition, the adversary
may compromise the sensor nodes near the innocent M so
that it can falsify all the verification seeds. Therefore, our
recursive traceback mechanism is also required to be applied
on SSQ to secure the verification seeds. Because of these two
additional changes in SSQ, the communication cost becomes
O(N2 +Nd).
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose schemes for securing range query, top-k query,
and skyline query, respectively. Two critical performance
metrics, detection probability and communication cost, are
analyzed. In particular, the performance of SRQ is superior
to all the prior works, while STQ and SSQ act as the
first proposals for securing top-k query and skyline query,
respectively, in tiered sensor networks. We also investigate the
security impact of collusion attacks and newly identified false-
information attacks, and explore the resiliency of the proposed
schemes against these two attacks.
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Abstract—In this paper, aiming at securing range query, top-k
query, and skyline query in tiered sensor networks, we propose
the Secure Range Query (SRQ), Secure Top-k Query (STQ), and
Secure Skyline Query (SSQ) schemes, respectively. In particular,
SRQ, by using our proposed prime aggregation technique, has
the lowest communication overhead among prior works, while
STQ and SSQ, to our knowledge, are the first proposals in
tiered sensor networks for securing top-k and skyline queries,
respectively. Moreover, the relatively unexplored issue of the
security impact of sensor node compromises on multidimensional
queries is studied; two attacks incurred from the sensor node
compromises, collusion attack and false-incrimination attack, are
investigated in this paper. After developing a novel technique
called subtree sampling, we also explore methods of efficiently
mitigating the threat of sensor node compromises. Performance
analyses regarding the probability for detecting incomplete
query-results and communication cost of the proposed schemes
are also studied.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tiered Sensor Networks. Sensor networks are expected to
be deployed on some harsh or hostile regions for data collec-
tion or environment monitoring. Since there is the possibility
of no stable connection between the authority and the network,
in-network storage is necessary for caching or storing the
data sensed by sensor nodes. A straightforward method is to
attach external storage to each node, but this is economically
infeasible. Therefore, various data storage models for sensor
networks have been studied in the literature. In [6], [20], a
notion of tiered sensor networks was discussed by introducing
an intermediate tier between the authority and the sensor
nodes. The purpose of this tier is to cache the sensed data
so that the authority can efficiently retrieve the cache data,
avoiding unnecessary communication with sensor nodes.
The network model considered in this paper is the same
as the ones in [6], [20]. More specifically, some storage-
abundant nodes, called storage nodes, which are equipped with
several gigabytes of NAND flash storage [22], are deployed
as the intermediate tier for data archival and query response.
In practice, some currently available sensor nodes such as
RISE [19] and StarGate [27] can work as the storage nodes.
The performance of sensor networks wherein external flash
memory is attached to the sensor nodes was also studied in
[14]. In addition, some theoretical issues concerning the tiered
sensor networks, such as the optimal storage node placement,
were also studied in [22], [28]. In fact, such a two-tiered
network architecture has been demonstrated to be useful in
increasing network capacity and scalability, reducing network
management complexity, and prolonging network lifetime.
Multidimensional Queries. Although a large amount of
sensed data can be stored in storage nodes, the authority
might be interested in only some portions of them. To this
end, the authority issues proper queries to retrieve the desired
portion of sensed data. Note that, when the sensed data have
multiple attributes, the query could be multidimensional. We
have observed that range query, top-k query, and skyline query
are the most commonly used queries. Range query [11], [16],
which could be useful for correlating events occurring within
the network, is used to retrieve sensed data whose attributes
are individually within a specified range. After mapping the
sensed data to a ranking value, top-k query [30], which can be
used to extract or observe the extreme phenomenon, is used to
retrieve the sensed data whose ranking values are among the
first k priority. Skyline query [5], [10], due to its promising
application in multi-criteria decision making, is also useful and
important in environment monitoring, industry control, etc.
Nonetheless, in the tiered network model, the storage nodes
become the targets that are easily compromised because of
their significant roles in responding to queries. For example,
the adversary can eavesdrop on the communications among
nodes or compromise the storage nodes to obtain the sensed
data, resulting in the breach of data confidentiality. After the
compromise of storage nodes, the adversary can also return
falsified query-results to the authority, leading to the breach
of query-result authenticity. Even more, the compromised
storage nodes can cause query-result incompleteness, creating
an incomplete query-result for the authority by dropping some
portions of the query-result.
Related Work. Secure range queries in tiered sensor
networks have been studied only in [21], [29], [34]. Data
confidentiality and query-result authenticity can be preserved
very well in [21], [29], [34] owing to the use of the bucket
scheme [8], [9]. Unfortunately, encoding approach [21] is only
suitable for the one-dimensional query scenario in the sensor
networks for environment monitoring purposes. On the other
hand, crosscheck approaches [29], [34] can be applied on
sensor networks for event-driven purposes at the expense of the
reduced probability for detecting query-result incompleteness.
The security issues incurred from the compromise of storage
nodes have been addressed in [21], [29], [34]. The impact of
collusion attacks defined as the collusion among compromised
sensor nodes and compromised storage nodes, however, was
2only discussed in [34], wherein only a naive method was
proposed as a countermeasure. When the compromised sensor
nodes are taken into account, a Denial-of-Service attack, called
false-incrimination attack, not addressed in the literature, can
be extremely harmful. In such an attack, the compromised
sensor nodes subvert the functionality of the secure query
schemes by simply claiming that their sensed data have been
dropped by the storage nodes. After that, the innocent storage
nodes will be considered compromised and will be revoked by
the authority. It should be noted that all the previous solutions
suffer from false-incrimination attacks.
Contribution. Our major contributions are:
• The Secure Range Query (SRQ) scheme is proposed to
secure the range query in tiered networks (Sec. III-A).
By taking advantage of our proposed prime aggregation
technique for securely transmitting the amount of data
in specified buckets, SRQ has the lowest communication
cost among prior works in all scenarios (environment
monitoring and event detection purposes), while preserv-
ing the probability for detecting incomplete query-results
close to 1. It should be noted that although incorporating
bucket scheme [8], [9] (described in Sec. III-A1) in the
protocol design [21], [29], [34] is not new, the novelty
of our method lies on the use of prime aggregation
in reducing the overhead and guaranteeing query-result
completeness.
• For the first time in the literature, the issues of securing
top-k and skyline queries in tiered networks are studied
(Secs. III-B and III-C). Our solutions to these two issues
are Secure Top-k Query (STQ) and Secure Skyline Query
(SSQ), respectively. The former is built upon the pro-
posed SRQ scheme to detect query-result completeness,
while the efficiency of SSQ is based on our proposed
grouping technique.
• The security impact of sensor compromises is studied
(Sec. V); collusion attack is formally addressed, and a
new Denial-of-Service attack, false-incrimination attack,
which can thwart the security purpose in prior works,
is first identified in our paper. The resiliency of SRQ,
STQ, and SSQ against these two attacks is investigated.
With a novel technique called subtree sampling, some
minor modifications are introduced for SRQ and STQ
as countermeasures to these two attacks. Moreover, the
compromised nodes can even be efficiently identified and
be further attested [23], [24], [26].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In general, the models used in this paper are very similar
to those in [6], [20], [21], [29], [34].
Network Model. As shown in Fig. 1, the sensor network
considered in this paper is composed of a large number of
resource-constrained sensor nodes and a few so-called storage
nodes. Storage nodes are assumed to be storage-abundant and
may be compromised. In addition, in certain cases, storage
nodes could also have abundant resources in energy, computa-
tion, and communication. The storage nodes can communicate
with the authority via direct or multi-hop communications. The
network is connected such that, for two arbitrary nodes, at least
one path connecting them can be found.
A cell is composed of a storage node and a number of
sensor nodes. In a cell, sensor nodes could be far away
from the associated storage node so that they can com-
municate with each other only through multi-hop commu-
nication. For example, in Fig. 1, without the relay of the
gray node, the black node cannot reach the storage node.
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Fig. 1: A tiered sensor network.
The nodes in the network
have synchronized clocks
[25] and the time is divided
into epochs. As in [21],
[22], [29], [34], each node
is assumed to be aware of
the geographic position it
locates [13], [33] so that
the association between the
sensor node and storage
node can be established. As
a matter of fact, informa-
tion about the time and ge-
ographic position is indis-
pensable for most sensor
network applications.
For each cell, aggregation is assumed to be performed
over an aggregation tree rooted at the storage node. Since
the optimization of the aggregation tree structure is out of
the scope of this paper, we adopt the method described in
TAG [15] to construct an aggregation tree. We follow the
conventional assumption that the topology of the aggregation
tree is known by the authority [2], [4]. Similar to sensor nodes,
storage nodes also perform the sensing task. Each sensor node
senses the data and temporarily stores the sensed data in its
local memory within an epoch. At the end of each epoch,
the sensor nodes in a cell report the sensed data stored in
local memory to the associated storage node. Throughout this
paper, we focus on a cell C, composed of N−1 sensor nodes,
{si}N−1i=1 , and a storage node M.
Security Model. We consider the adversary who can com-
promise an arbitrary number of storage nodes. After node
compromises, all the information stored in the compromised
storage nodes will be exposed to the adversary. The goal
of the adversary is to breach at least one of the following:
data confidentiality, query-result authenticity, and query-result
completeness. We temporarily do not consider the compromise
of sensor nodes in describing SRQ, STQ, and SSQ in Sec. III.
The impact of sensor node compromise on the security breach,
however, will be explored in Sec. V. Many security issues
in sensor networks, such as key management [3], [7], [31],
broadcast authentication [12], [17], and secure localization
[13], [33], have been studied in the literature. This paper fo-
cuses on securing multidimensional queries that are relatively
unexplored in the literature, while the protocol design of the
aforementioned issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
Query Model. The sensed data can be represented as a d-
3dimensional tuple, (A1, A2, . . . , Ad), where Ag , ∀g ∈ [1, d],
denotes the g-th attribute. The authority may issue a proper d-
dimensional query to retrieve the desired portion of data stored
in storage nodes. Three types of queries, including range query,
top-k query, and skyline query, are considered in this paper.
For range query, its form, issued by the authority, is expressed
as 〈C, t, l1, h1, . . . , ld, hd〉, which means that the sensed data to
be reported to the authority should be generated by the nodes
in cell C at epoch t, and their g-th attributes, Ag’s, should be
within the range of [lg, hg], g ∈ [1, d]. Top-k query is usually
associated with a scalar (linear) ranking function. With ranking
function, R, the sensed data, even if it is multidimensional, can
be individually mapped to a one-dimensional ranking value.
The top-k query issued by the authority is in the form of
〈C, t, R, k〉. As the first attempt to achieve secure top-k query,
the goal of top-k query in this paper is simply assumed to
obtain the sensed data generated by the nodes in cell C at epoch
t with the first k smallest ranking values. For skyline query,
the desired skyline data are defined as those not dominated by
any other data. Assuming that smaller values are preferable to
large ones for all attributes, for a set of d-dimensional data, a
datum ci dominates another datum cj if both the conditions,
Ag(ci) ≤ Ag(cj), ∀g ∈ [1, d], and Ag(ci) < Ag(cj), ∃g ∈
[1, d], where Ag(ci) denotes the g-th attribute value of the
datum ci, hold. Hence, the form of the skyline query issued
by the authority is given as 〈C, t〉, which is used to retrieve
the skyline data generated in cell C at epoch t.
III. SECURING MULTIDIMENSIONAL QUERIES
In this section, aiming at securing range query, top-k query,
and skyline query, we propose the SRQ (Sec. III-A), STQ
(Sec. III-B), and SSQ (Sec. III-C) schemes, respectively. Note
that though SRQ, STQ, and SSQ use the bucket scheme [8],
[9], the novelty of them is due to their design in efficiently
detecting the incomplete query-result (described later).
A. Securing Range Queries (SRQ)
Our proposed SRQ scheme consists of a confidentiality-
preserving reporting phase (Sec. III-A1) that can simultane-
ously prevent the adversary from accessing data stored in
the storage nodes, authenticate the query results, and ensure
efficient multidimensional query processing, and a query-result
completeness verification phase (Sec. III-A2) for guaranteeing
the completeness of query-results.
1) Confidentiality-preserving reporting: Data encryption is
a straightforward and common method of ensuring data confi-
dentiality against a compromised storage node. Moreover, we
hope that even when the adversary compromises the storage
node, the previously stored information should not be exposed
to the adversary. To this end, the keys used in encryption
should be selected from a one-way hash chain. In particular,
assume that a key Ki,0 is initially stored in sensor node si.
At the beginning of epoch t, the key Ki,t, which is used only
within epoch t, is calculated as hash(Ki,t−1), where hash(·)
is a hash function, and Ki,t−1 is dropped. Suppose that sensor
node si has sensed data D at epoch t. One method for storing
D in the storage node M while preserving the privacy is to
send {D}Ki,t , which denotes the encryption of D with the
key Ki,t. With this method, when an OCB-like authenticated
encryption primitive [18] is exploited, the authenticity of D
can be guaranteed. At the same time, D will not be known
by the adversary during message forwarding and even after
the compromise of the storage node at epoch t because the
adversary cannot recover the keys used in the time before
epoch t. Nevertheless, no query can be answered by M if
only encrypted data is stored in M. Hence, the bucket scheme
proposed in [8], [9], which uses the encryption keys generated
via a one-way hash chain, is used in the SRQ scheme.
In the bucket scheme, the domain of each attribute Ag ,
∀g ∈ [1, d], is assumed to be known in advance, and is
divided into wg ≥ 1 consecutive non-overlapping intervals
sequentially indexed from 1 to wg , under a publicly known
partitioning rule. For ease of representation, in the following,
we assume that wg = w, ∀g ∈ [1, d]. A d-dimensional bucket
is defined as a tuple, (v1, v2, . . . , vd) (hereafter called bucket
ID), where vg ∈ [1, w], g ∈ [1, d]. The sensor node si, when
it has sensed data at epoch t, sends to M the corresponding
bucket IDs, which are constructed by mapping each attribute
of the sensed data to the proper interval index, and the sensed
data encrypted by the key Ki,t. For example, when si has
sensed data (1, 3), (2, 4), and (2, 11) at epoch t, the message
transmitted to the storage node at the end of epoch t is
〈i, t, (1, 1), {(1, 3), (2, 4)}Ki,t, (1, 2), {(2, 11)}Ki,t〉, assuming
that A1, A2 ∈ [1, 20], w = 2, and each interval length, set at
10, is the same.
Let V be the set of all possible bucket IDs. Assume that
there are on average Y and Y/N data generated in a cell and
in a node, respectively, at epoch t. Assume that, Di,t,V is a
set containing all the data within the bucket V ∈ V sensed
by si at epoch t. The messages sent from si to M at the
end of epoch t can be abstracted as 〈i, t, Jσ, {Di,t,Jσ}Ki,t〉,
where Jσ ∈ V , Jσ 6= Jσ′ , 1 ≤ σ, σ′ ≤ Y/N if there are some
data sensed by si within epoch t. Note that si sends nothing
to M if Di,t,Jσ ’s, ∀Jσ ∈ V , are empty. After that, M can
answer the range query according to the information revealed
by the bucket IDs. Assume that lg and hg are located within
the αg-th and βg-th intervals, respectively, where αg ≤ βg , αg ,
βg ∈ [1, w], and g ∈ [1, d]. The encrypted data falling into the
buckets in the set A = {(ρ1, . . . , ρd)|αg ≤ ρg ≤ βg, g ∈
[1, d]} are reported to the authority. In other words, once
receiving the range query, M first translates the information
l1, h1, . . . , ld, hd into the proper bucket IDs and then replies
all the encrypted data falling into the buckets1 in A.
Nevertheless, in tiered sensor networks, even when the
original bucket scheme is used, M could still maliciously
drop some encrypted data and only report part of the results
to the authority, resulting in an incomplete query-result. In
1There is a tradeoff between the communication cost and confidentiality
in terms of bucket sizes because larger bucket size implies higher data
confidentiality and higher communication cost due to more superfluous data
being returned to the authority. The design of optimal bucketing strategies is
beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer to [8], [9] for more details.
4the following, we will describe an extended bucket scheme,
which incorporates the prime aggregation strategy into the
original bucket scheme, to detect the incomplete reply in a
communication-efficient manner.
2) Query-Result Completeness Verification: With prime
aggregation technique, SRQ detects an incomplete reply by
taking advantage of aggregation for counting the amount of
sensed data falling into specified buckets. Together with a
hash for verification purpose, the count forms a so-called
proof in detecting an incomplete reply. The storage node M
is required to provide the proof to the authority at the epoch
specified in the query so that the authority can use the proof
to verify the completeness of received query-results. Since in
our design all the sub-proofs generated by the nodes can be
aggregated to yield the final proof, the communication cost can
be significantly reduced. The details are described as follows.
Assume that an aggregation tree [15] has been constructed
after sensor deployment. Recall that the domain of attribute Ag
is divided into w intervals. Before the sensor deployment, a
set {pVi , p∅i |∀i ∈ [1, N−1], V ∈ V} of (wd+1)(N−1) prime
numbers is selected by the authority such that pVi 6= pV
′
i′ and
p∅i 6= p∅i′ if i 6= i′ or V 6= V ′. Then, the set {pVi , p∅i |V ∈ V} of
wd+1 prime numbers, called the set of bucket primes of si, is
stored in each sensor node si. In addition, a set {kVi,0, k∅i,0|V ∈
V} of wd + 1 keys is selected by the authority and is stored
in each sensor node si initially. For fixed i and t, the set of
{kVi,t, k∅i,0|V ∈ V} is called the set of bucket keys of si at epoch
t. Bucket primes could be publicly-known, while bucket keys
should be kept secret. Each sensor node si, at the beginning of
epoch t, calculates kVi,t = hash(kVi,t−1) and then drops kVi,t−1,
∀V ∈ V . In addition, si also calculates k∅i,t = hash(k∅i,t−1)
and then drops k∅i,t−1.
Recall that each node si on average has Y/N sensed data
at epoch t, and assume that the set of Y/N bucket IDs
associated with these Y/N sensed data is Bi,t = {vˆi,t,σ|σ =
1, . . . , Y/N}, which could be a multiset. Then, according to
its sensed data, si calculates Hi,t = hashKi,t(
∑Y/N
σ=1 k
vˆi,t,σ
i,t ),
where hashK(·) denotes the keyed hash function with key
K , if it has sensed data, and Hi,t = hashKi,t(k∅i,t) oth-
erwise. Moreover, si computes Pi,t =
∏Y/N
σ=1 p
vˆi,t,σ
i if it
has sensed data, and Pi,t = p∅i otherwise. Moreover, once
receiving 〈jρ, t, Ejρ,t,Bjρ,t,Hjρ,t,Pjρ,t〉, jρ ∈ [1, N−1], ∀ρ ∈
[1, χ] from its χ children, sj1 , . . . , sjχ , si calculates Ei,t =
(
⋃χ
ρ=1 Ejρ,t)
⋃
Ei,t, where Ei,t denotes the set of encrypted
data sensed by si at epoch t, and Bi,t = (
⋃χ
ρ=1 Bjρ,t)
⋃
Bi,t,
where Bi,t denotes the set of bucket IDs of Ei,t. In addition,
si also calculates Hi,t = hashKi,t(
∑χ
ρ=1Hjρ,t + Hi,t) and
Pi,t =
∏χ
ρ=1 Pjρ,t · Pi,t, ρ ∈ [1, χ]. Finally, si reports
〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t〉 to its parent node on the aggregation
tree. Note that, if si is a leaf node on the aggregation tree,
then we assume that it receives 〈∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, 0, 1〉.
Assume that the set {pVM, p∅M|V ∈ V} of wd + 1 prime
numbers stored in M are all different from those stored in
sensor nodes, and the set {kVM,0, k∅M,0|V ∈ V} of wd + 1
bucket keys are selected by the authority and stored in M. M
computes kVM,t = hash(kVM,t−1) and drops kVM,t−1 at epoch
t. In addition, M also computes k∅M,t = hash(k∅M,t−1) and
drops k∅M,t−1 at epoch t. For the storage node M, it can also
calculate EM,t, BM,t, HM,t, and PM,t according to the its
own sensed data at epoch t. In fact, the proceduresM needs to
perform after messages are received from the child nodes are
the same as the ones performed by the sensor nodes. Acting
as the root of the aggregation tree, however, M keeps the
aggregated results, which are denoted as EM,t,BM,t,HM,t
and PM,t, respectively, in its local storage and waits for the
query issued by the authority. Note that PM,t can be thought
of as a compact summary of the sensed data of the whole
network and can be very useful for the authority in checking
the completeness of the query-result, while HM,t can be used
by the authority to verify the authenticity of PM,t.
Assume that a range query 〈C, t, l1, h1, l2, h2, . . . , ld, hd〉
is issued by the authority. The encrypted data falling into
the buckets in the set A, along with the proof composed
of HM,t and PM,t, are sent to the authority. Once PM,t
is received, the authority immediately performs the prime
factor decomposition of PM,t. Due to the construction of
{pVi , pVM, p∅i , p∅M|i ∈ [1, N − 1], V ∈ V}, which guarantees
that the bucket primes are all distinct, after the prime factor
decomposition of PM,t, the authority can be aware of which
node contributes which data within specified buckets. As a
result, the authority can know which keys should be used to
verify the authenticity and integrity of HM,t. More specifi-
cally, assume that PM,t = (p1)a1 · · · (pγ)aγ , a1, . . . , aγ > 0,
γ ≥ 0, and that p1, . . . , pγ are distinct prime numbers. From
the construction of PM,t, we know that (pkˆ)
a
kˆ , for kˆ ∈ [1, γ],
is equal to (pk′′k′ )akˆ , for k′ ∈ [1, N − 1] and k′′ ∈ V . From
the procedure performed by each node, it can also be known
that the appearance of (pkˆ)
a
kˆ = (pk
′′
k′ )
a
kˆ in PM,t means that
at epoch t the sensor node sk′ produces akˆ data falling into
bucket k′′, contributing the bucket key kk′′k′,t in total akˆ times in
HM,t. Here, the sensor node sk′ producing the data falling into
the bucket ∅ means that sk′ senses nothing. Thus, we can infer
the total amount of data falling into specified buckets at epoch
t. Recall that the authority is aware of the topology of the
aggregation tree. Thus, after the prime factor decomposition
of PM,t, the authority can reconstruct HM,t according to the
derived akˆ’s and pkˆ’s by its own effort, because it knows Ki,t
and kVi,t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N−1,M}, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀V ∈ V . Therefore,
we know that the HM,t reconstructed by the authority is equal
to the received HM,t if and only if the received PM,t are
considered authentic. When the verification of PM,t fails, M
is considered compromised. When the verification of PM,t is
successful, the authority decrypts all the received encryptions,
and checks whether the number of query-results falling into
the buckets in A matches those indicated by PM,t. If and
only if there are matches in all the buckets in A, the received
query-results are considered complete.
B. Securing Top-k Queries (STQ)
Basically, the proposed STQ scheme for securing top-k
query is built upon SRQ in that both confidentiality-preserving
5reporting and query-result completeness verification phases in
SRQ are exploited. In particular, based on the proof generated
in SRQ, since it can know which buckets contain data, the
authority can also utilize such information to examine the
completeness of query-results of top-k query. In other words,
top-k query can be secured by the use of the SRQ scheme.
Because of the similarity between the SRQ and STQ schemes,
some details of the STQ scheme will be omitted in the
following description.
Here, a bucket data set is defined to be composed of
bucket IDs. We use a d-dimensional tuple, (v1, . . . , vd), where
vg ∈ [1, w], to represent the bucket IDs in a bucket data
set. With this representation, we can use the ranking func-
tion, R, to calculate the ranking value of each bucket ID.
Assume that the ν-th interval in the g-th attribute contains
the values in [uℓg,ν , uhg,ν]. The ranking value of the bucket ID,
(v1, . . . , vd), is evaluated as R(
uℓ
1,v1
+uh
1,v1
2 , . . . ,
uℓd,vd
+uhd,vd
2 ),
where the d-dimensional tuple, (u
ℓ
1,v1
+uh
1,v1
2 , . . . ,
uℓd,vd
+uhd,vd
2 ),
whose individual entry is simply averaged over the minimum
and maximum values in each interval, acts as the representative
of the bucket (v1, . . . , vd) for simplicity.
Recall that we simply assume that the data with the first
k smallest ranking values are desired. The general form of
the message sent from si to its parent node at the end of
epoch t is 〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t〉, where Ei,t, Bi,t, Hi,t,
and Pi,t are the same as those defined in SRQ. Assume that
ζ1, . . . , ζk ∈ V are k bucket IDs in the bucket data set whose
ranking values are among the first k smallest ones. According
to BM,t, M can calculate the ranking values of bucket IDs
in BM,t and, therefore, knows ζ1, . . . , ζk. To answer a top-k
query, 〈C, t, k〉, the storage node M reports the bucket IDs,
ζ1, . . . , ζk, and their corresponding encrypted data, along with
HM,t and PM,t, to the authority because it can be known that
the data with the first k smallest ranking values must be within
ζ1, . . . , ζk. After receiving the query-result, the authority can
first verify the authenticity of Pi,t by using Hi,t, and verify the
query-result completeness by using Pi,t. Note that both of the
above verifications can be performed in a way similar to the
one described in Sec. III-A. Actually, after receiving Pi,t, the
authority knows which buckets contain data and the amount of
data. Hence, knowing uℓg,ν and uhg,ν , ∀g ∈ [1, d], ∀ν ∈ [1, w],
the authority can also obtain ζ1, . . . , ζk. Afterwards, what the
authority should do is to check if it receives the bucket IDs,
ζ1, . . . , ζk, and if the number of data in bucket ζg′ , g′ ∈ [1, k],
is consistent with the number indicated by Pi,t. If and only
if these two verifications pass, the authority considers the
received query-result to be complete and extracts the top-k
result from the encrypted data sent from M.
C. Securing Skyline Queries (SSQ)
To support secure skyline query in sensor networks, in the
following we first present a naive approach as baseline, and
then propose an advanced approach that employs a grouping
technique for simultaneously reducing the computation and
communication cost.
1) Baseline scheme: To ensure the data confidentiality and
authenticity, as in the SRQ and STQ schemes, the sensed data
are also encrypted by using the bucket scheme mentioned in
Sec. III-A1. At the end of epoch t, each si broadcasts its
sensor ID, all the sensed data encrypted by key Ki,t, and
the proper bucket IDs to all the nodes within the same cell.
Then, according to the broadcast messages, each sensor node
si at epoch t has a bucket data set composed of the bucket
IDs extracted from broadcast messages and the bucket IDs
corresponding to its own sensed data. In fact, the bucket data
sets constructed by different nodes in the same cell at epoch
t will be the same. Treating these bucket IDs as data points,
si can find the set Φt of skyline buckets that are defined as
the bucket IDs not dominated by the other bucket IDs. Here,
since the bucket IDs are represented also by d-dimensional
tuples, the notion of domination is the same as the one defined
in the query model of Sec. II. Define quasi-skyline data as
the set of data falling into the skyline buckets. It can be
observed that the set of skyline data must be a subset of quasi-
skyline data. After doing so, each node can locally find2 the
quasi-skyline data, although there could be the cases where
superfluous data are also included. At the end of epoch t, if
Ki,t is smaller than a pre-determined threshold, then si sends
its sensor ID and hashKi,t(Φt) to M. Here, hashKi,t(Φt)
works as a kind of proof so that it can be used for checking
the query-result completeness. Note that only hashKi,t(Φt)
needs to be transmitted to M because M also receives all the
encrypted data and bucket IDs, and can calculate the quasi-
skyline data by itself after message broadcasting.
To answer the skyline query 〈C, t〉 the storage node reports
the quasi-skyline data calculated at epoch t and the hash values
received at epoch t to the the authority. Since the authority
knows the threshold and Ki,0 ∀i ∈ [1, N ], it will expect to
receive hash values from a set of sensor nodes whose keys are
smaller than the threshold. Unfortunately, due to the network-
wide broadcast, this baseline scheme works but is inefficient
in terms of communication overhead. Hence, an efficient SSQ
scheme exploiting a grouping strategy is proposed as follows.
2) Grouping technique: Like the baseline scheme, the
bucket scheme mentioned in Sec. III-A1 is also used. Given
a data set O and a collection {O1, · · · ,Oτ} of subsets of O
satisfying
⋃τ
j=1Oj = O and Oj ∩ Oj′ = ∅, ∀j 6= j′ for
τ ≥ 1. An observation is that the skyline data of O must be
a subset of the union of the skyline data of Oj , ∀j ∈ [1, τ ].
Thus, the key idea of our proposed SSQ scheme is to partition
the sensor nodes in a cell into groups so that broadcasting can
be limited within a group, resulting in reduced computation
and communication costs. In what follows, the SSQ scheme
will be described in more detail.
The sensor nodes in a cell are divided into µ disjoint
groups, Gη , ∀η ∈ [1, µ], each of which is composed of |Gη|
2The design of an algorithm for efficiently finding the skyline data given a
data set is a research topic, but is beyond the scope of this paper. We consider
the naive data-wise comparison-based algorithm with running time O(n2) if
the size of the data set is n, but each node, in fact, can implement an arbitrary
algorithm for finding skyline data in our setting.
6sensor nodes. The grouping needs to be performed only once
right after the sensor deployment. Note that each group is
formed by nearby sensor nodes and the grouping procedure
is independent of the structure of the aggregation tree without
affecting SRQ and STQ. Let cell-region be part of the sensing
region monitored by one specified cell. For example, with the
assumption that the shape of each cell-region is approximately
a square, as shown in Fig. 1, and sensor nodes with uniform
deployment are considered, the grouping can be achieved by
simply dividing a cell-region into µ (= √N ) sub-cell-regions.
The sensor nodes in the same sub-cell-region form a group.
Note that the square cell-region is assumed here for ease of
explanation, but is not necessary for the grouping procedures3.
At the end of epoch t, each sensor node si broadcasts its
sensor ID, its order seed θi,t = hashKi,t(i), all the sensed data
encrypted with the key Ki,t, and the proper bucket IDs to all
the nodes within the same group. After doing so, as in baseline
scheme, the sensor nodes in the same group can locally find
the quasi-skyline data from the bucket data set whose entries
are generated by the sensor nodes in the same group. Let Φη,t
be the set of skyline bucket IDs and φη,t their corresponding
quasi-skyline data encrypted by the sensor nodes in group η
using proper keys at epoch t. At the end of epoch t, if θi,t
is among the first ξ1 smallest ones in the set of order seeds
in group η at epoch t, where ξ1 is a pre-determined threshold
known by each node, then si reports Φη,t, φη,t, its verification
seed hashKi,t(Φη,t), and the IDs of sensor nodes generating
φη,t to M. In fact, ξ1 = 1 is sufficient for the verification
purpose. ξ1, however, is also related to the resiliency against
sensor node compromises. Thus, we still keep ξ1 as a variable
and defer the explanation of the purpose of ξ1 to Sec. V.
Here, the purpose of verification seeds is that the completeness
of quasi-skyline data can be guaranteed by exactly ξ1 sensor
nodes for each group, while the purpose of order seed is to
guarantee that at each epoch exactly ξ1 sensor nodes will send
the verification seeds as the proofs.
To answer a skyline query, 〈C, t〉, the storage node M
reports a hash of all the received verification seeds, ht =
hash(||i∈ΓthashKi,t(Φi,t)), where || denotes the bit-string
concatenation and Γt is the set of sensor nodes responsible
for sending a hash value to M in each group at epoch t, the
set of skyline bucket IDs, and their corresponding encrypted
data received at epoch t to the authority. Since it knows the
threshold ξ1 and Ki,t, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1,M}, the authority
will expect to receive a particular hash value from M. If
and only if the hash sent from the M matches the hash of
the verification seeds calculated according to the knowledge
of Γt and Ki,t by the authority itself, the received data are
considered complete, and contain the skyline data.
3For example, the authority knowing the position of each node or the use of
clustering algorithms can also divide nodes into groups. In general, after the
localization, each sensor node can join the proper group possibly according
to its geographic position when the grouping information such as the sizes of
sensing region and cell-region are preloaded in sensor nodes.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We will focus on analyzing the critical issue of detecting
an incomplete query-result in tiered networks. In this section,
the detection probability and communication cost of query-
result completeness verification in the proposed schemes will
be analyzed. It is assumed that the number of hops between
M and each sensor node is √n for a collection of n uniformly
deployed nodes [1]. In this section, both detection probability
and communication cost are discussed at a fixed epoch t.
As the communication cost of encoding approach [21]
grows exponentially with the number of attributes, and some
crosscheck approaches [29], [34] have relatively low detection
probability, in the following, we compare SRQ with only
hybrid crosscheck [34], which achieves the best balance be-
tween the detection probability and communication cost in the
literature. Note that, the parameter setting required in hybrid
crosscheck is the same as that listed in [34].
A. Detection Probability
The detection probability is defined as the probability that
the compromised storage node M is detected if it returns
an incomplete query-result. With the fact that the larger the
portion of query-result M drops, higher the probability that
the authority detects it, we consider the worst case that only
one bucket and its corresponding data in the query-result are
dropped by M and the number of data sensed by a node is
either 0 or 1 as the lower bound of detection probability.
1) Detection probability for SRQ and STQ: To return an
incomplete query-result without being detected by the author-
ity, M should create a proof, 〈ĤM,t, P̂M,t〉, corresponding
to the incomplete query-result. Since bucket primes can be
known by the adversary, P̂M,t can be easily constructed.
Nevertheless, ĤM,t cannot be constructed, since the bucket
keys of sensor nodes generating the bucket dropped by M are
not known by the adversary. Therefore, only two options can
be chosen by the adversary. First, the adversary can directly
guess to obtain ĤM,t, with probability being 2−ℓh , where ℓh
is the number of bits output by a keyed hash function. This
implies that the detection probability PSRQdet,1 is 1 − 2−ℓh for
the first case. Second, knowing the aggregation tree topology,
the adversary can also follow the rule of SRQ to construct the
ĤM,t without considering the bucket key of dropped bucket.
Assume that the probability that a sensor node has sensed
data is δ. The size of the bucket key pool can be derived as
(N−2)(2δ+1−δ)+2 = Nδ+N−2δ. Thus, the probability
for the adversary to guess successfully is 2−ℓk(Nδ+N−2δ),
where ℓk is the number of bits of a key, leading to the
detection probability PSRQdet,2 is 1 − 2−ℓk(Nδ+N−2δ) for the
second case. Overall, the final detection probability, PSRQdet ,
is min{PSRQdet,1,PSRQdet,2}. On the other hand, as stated in Sec.
III-B, the STQ scheme is built upon the SRQ scheme. Thus,
the detection probability, PSTQdet , will be the same as P
SRQ
det .
As Fig. 2 depicts, the detection probability of SRQ is close
to 1 in any case. However, hybrid crosscheck is effective only
when a few sensed data are generated in the network. Such
7a performance difference can be attributed to the fact that the
sensed data in the network are securely and deterministically
summarized in the proof of SRQ but they are probabilistically
summarized in hybrid crosscheck.
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Fig. 2: The detection probability of SRQ and hybrid crosscheck in the cases that (a)
Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
2) Detection probability for SSQ: To return an incom-
plete query-result without being detected by the authority,
M should forge a proof, i.e., a hash ĥt of all the received
verification seeds, corresponding to the incomplete query-
result. Therefore, only two options can be chosen by the
adversary. First, the adversary can directly guess a hash value
ĥt. The probability for the adversary to guess successfully is
2−ℓh , implying the detection probability PSSQdet,1 is 1 − 2−ℓh
in this case. Second, the adversary can also follow the rule
of SRQ to construct ĥt for incomplete data. In this case, the
adversary is forced to guess ξ1 keys for each one of µ groups,
leading to the probability of success guess being 2−ℓkµξ1 and
the detection probability being PSSQdet,2 = 1 − 2−ℓkµξ1 . The
final detection probability, PSSQdet , is thus, min{PSSQdet,1,PSSQdet,2}.
Obviously, PSSQdet will also be close to 1 when appropriate key
length or hash function is selected.
B. Communication Cost
The communication cost, T, is defined as the number of bits
in the communications required for the proposed schemes. We
are mainly interested in the asymptotic result in terms of d
and N because they reflect the scalability of the number of
attributes and the network size, respectively. We do not count
the number of bits in representing data, Ei,t, since the sending
of Ei,t is necessary in any data collection scheme. We further
assume that there are on average pdtobY data buckets, where
0 ≤ pdtob ≤ 1, generated in cell C.
1) Communication Cost of SRQ and STQ: Each sensor
node si in SRQ is required to send Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t to
its parent node. Nevertheless, Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t can be
aggregated along the path in the aggregation tree. As a con-
sequence, si actually has only one-hop broadcast containing
Bi,t,Hi,t, and Pi,t once at each epoch. In addition, to answer
a range query, M is responsible for sending HM,t, PM,t,
and the bucket IDs in A. In summary, the communication
cost, TSRQ, can be calculated as (N − 1)(ℓh + ℓP ) +
pdtobY ⌈logw⌉d logN + ℓh + ℓP + |A|⌈logw⌉d = O(N +
d logN), where ℓP is the number of bits used to represent the
bucket prime PM,t. Due to the similarity between SRQ and
STQ, the communication cost, TSTQ, can also be calculated
as O(N + d logN) in a way similar to the one for obtaining
T
SRQ
.
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Fig. 3: The communication cost of SRQ and hybrid crosscheck in the cases that (a)
Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
As shown in Fig. 3 where the parameters ℓh = 80 and
ℓP = 1000 are used, the communication cost of SRQ
is significantly lower than that of hybrid crosscheck. More
specifically, as the communication cost of hybrid crosscheck
can be asymptotically represented as O(N2+Nd) and will be
drastically increased with N and d, the proposed SRQ scheme,
however, exhibits low communication cost regardless of the
amount of sensed data in the network due to the fact that the
size of the proof used in SRQ is always a constant. Hence,
the communication cost of SRQ will be dominated by the
aggregation procedure, the average hop distance between M
and each node, and the transmission of bucket IDs, resulting
O(N + d logN) communication cost.
2) Communication Cost of SSQ: Since grouping is only
performed once after sensor deployment, we ignore its com-
munication cost. Note that, in the following, the communica-
tion cost of the data should be counted because it is involved
in the design of SSQ. After the grouping, each si broadcasts
8the data bucket IDs, sensor ID, and the order seed to all the
nodes within the same group. Assuming that the nodes employ
a duplicate suppression algorithm, by which each node only
broadcasts a given message once, one node should broadcast
a message with YN ℓd +
pdtobY
N ⌈logw⌉d+ ℓid + ℓh bits, where
ℓd is the average size of a datum and ℓid is the number of bits
required to represent sensor IDs, resulting in communication
cost of C1 = |Gη|2( YN ℓd + pdtobYN ⌈logw⌉d + ℓid + ℓh) bits
in each group. Let 0 ≤ pq ≤ 1 be the average ratio of
the quasi-skyline data to all the sensed data. |Φη,t| is equal
to pdtobpqY on average. Then, once the the order seed is
among the first ξ1 smallest ones of the order seeds in a group,
si ∈ Gη is required for sending Φη,t, φη,t, hashKi,t(Φη,t),
its sensor ID, and the IDs of sensor nodes generating buckets
in Φη,t to M, implying the communication cost of C2 =
pdtobpqY ⌈logw⌉d+pqY ℓd+ℓh+ℓid+|Gη|ℓid bits in the worst
case. Note that the verification seeds cannot be aggregated,
although the verification seed can also be delivered along the
path to M on the aggregation tree. M needs to send the
skyline bucket IDs, its sensor ID, and a hash ht as the proof to
the authority for answering the query. The communication cost
of M is C3 = ℓid+ ℓh+µ
∑µ
η=1 pdtobpqY ⌈logw⌉d+pqY ℓd.
Consequently, the upper bound of communication cost, TSSQ,
can be obtained as µC1+µξ1C2 logN +C3 = O(N
3
2 +Nd)
when µ =
√
N and |Gη| =
√
N , ∀η ∈ [1, µ]. By similar
derivation, the communication cost of the baseline scheme is
O(N2d). Thus, exploiting the proposed grouping technique
does reduce the required communication cost. The trends of
communication cost in SSQ are shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: The communication cost of SSQ for (a) Y = 100 and (b) Y = 5000.
V. IMPACT OF SENSOR NODE COMPROMISE
In the previous discussions, we have ignored the impact of
the compromise of sensor nodes. In practice, the adversary
could take the control of sensor nodes to enhance the ability
of performing malicious operations. The notation s is used
to denote a set of random sensor nodes compromised by
the adversary. In collusion attack considered here, M col-
ludes with s in the hope that more portions of query-results
generated by innocent sensor nodes can be dropped. Since
crosscheck approaches [34] suffer from collusion attacks, the
impact of collusion attack on secure range query for tiered
sensor networks was addressed in [34]. Their proposed method
is random probing, by which the authority occasionally checks
if there is no data sensed by some randomly selected sensor
nodes by directly communicating with them. Random probing,
however, can only discover the incomplete query-results with
an inefficient but possibly lucky way and cannot identify s.
On the other hand, in this paper, we identify a new Denial-
of-Service attack never addressed in the literature, called false-
incrimination attack, by which s provides false sub-proofs to
the innocent storage node so that the innocent storage node
will be regarded as the compromised one and be revoked.
Unfortunately, all the prior works [21], [29], [34] suffer from
this attack. In summary, with minor modifications involved,
our proposed SRQ, STQ, and SSQ schemes are resilient
against both the collusion attack and false-incrimination attack.
It should be especially noted that, in the following discus-
sion of SRQ, we temporarily make two unrealistic assumptions
that the compromised nodes can only disobey the procedures
of the proposed schemes4 and the (subtree) proofs (defined
later) will not be manipulated by the compromised storage
and sensor nodes, in order to emphasize on the effectiveness
of our proposed technique in identifying compromised nodes.
Nevertheless, these two assumptions will be relaxed later.
Impact of Sensor Node Compromise on SRQ and STQ.
Under the above two assumptions, the SRQ scheme is in-
herently resilient against collusion attack, because, regardless
of the existence and position of s, the proper bucket keys
will be embedded into the proofs and cannot be removed
by s. Nevertheless, SRQ could be vulnerable to the false-
incrimination attack since false sub-proofs injected by s will
be integrated with the other correct sub-proofs to construct
a false proof, leading to the revocation of innocent M. Here,
we present a novel technique called subtree sampling enabling
SRQ, with a slight modification, to efficiently mitigate the
threat of false-incrimination attacks. The idea of subtree
sampling is to check if the proof constructed by the nodes
in a random subtree with fixed depth is authentic so as
to perform the attestation only on the remaining suspicious
nodes. Let m be a user-selected constant indicating the
subtree depth. In the modified SRQ scheme, once receiving
〈jρ, t, Ejρ,t,Bjρ,t,Hjρ,t,Pjρ,t, ϑ0jρ,t, . . . , ϑm−1jρ,t 〉, jρ ∈ [1, N −
1], ∀ρ ∈ [1, χ], from its χ children, sj1 , . . . , sjχ , each si
calculates Ejρ,t, Bjρ,t, Hjρ,t, and Pjρ,t as in the original SRQ
scheme. Note that, if si is a leaf node on the aggregation
tree, it is assumed that si receives 〈∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, 0, 1, ∅, . . . , ∅〉. In
the modified SRQ scheme, however, si additionally performs
4In other words, compromised nodes are assumed to not inject bogus sensor
readings. They can only manipulate its own subproof and the proofs sent from
its descendant sensor nodes.
9the following operations. Assume that H¯υjρ,t, P¯
υ
jρ,t ∈ ϑυjρ,t,∀υ ∈ [0,m − 1], ∀jρ ∈ [1, N − 1], and ∀ρ ∈ [1, χ]. si
calculates H¯υi,t = hashKi,t(
∑χ
ρ=1 H¯
υ−1
jρ,t
+ Hi,t) and P¯ υi,t =∏χ
ρ=1 P¯
υ−1
jρ,t
· Pi,t, ∀υ ∈ [1,m]. si also calculates H¯0i,t = Hi,t
and P¯ 0i,t = Pi,t, where Hi,t and Pi,t are computed in a way
stated in Sec. III-A. Then, H¯υi,t and P¯ υi,t are assigned to set
ϑυi,t, ∀υ ∈ [0,m − 1]. If hashKi,t(i) ≤ ξ2, where ξ2 is a
pre-determined threshold known by each node and will be
analyzed later, then si sends ϑmi,t to (possibly compromised)
M. Let Tmi be a subtree of the underlying aggregation tree,
rooted at si with depth m. ϑmi,t generated by si can be thought
of as the subtree proof of the data sensed by the nodes in Tmi .
Finally, si sends 〈i, t, Ei,t,Bi,t,Hi,t,Pi,t, ϑ0i,t, . . . , ϑm−1i,t 〉 to
its parent node. Let Wt be the witness set of sensor nodes
satisfying hashKi,t(i) ≤ ξ2 at epoch t. The nodes in Wt are
called witness nodes at epoch t.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: The conceptual diagrams of identifying the compromised nodes. (a) Only the
nodes in red area need to be attested. (b) Only the nodes in gray area need to be attested.
We first consider the simplest case, where no compromised
nodes act as the witness nodes. We further assume that only
one compromised node (i.e., |s| = 1) injects false sub-proof
for simplicity and our method can be adapted to the case of
multiple compromised nodes injecting false sub-proofs. We
have the following observation regarding each witness node si
and its generated ϑmi,t. Assume that the query-result is found to
be incomplete at epoch t. The authority requests ϑmi,t for each
witness node si stored in M. To identify the compromised
nodes, all the nodes at first are considered neutral. The nodes
in Tmi become innocent if the verification of ϑmi,t passes, and
the nodes in Tmi become suspicious otherwise5. The above
verification is performed as follows. According to the P¯mi,t in
the subtree proof ϑmi,t, the authority knows which nodes in the
subtree Tmi contribute data and their amount. The authority
can, based on this information, calculate H¯mi,t by itself. Define
ETm
i
,t as the set of data sensed by the nodes in Tmi , and BTmi ,t
as the corresponding bucket IDs of ETmi ,t. As a consequence,
the verification passes if and only if the H¯i,t calculated by
the authority itself is equal to the H¯i,t extracted from the
received received ϑmi,t, and the amount of the data in ETmi ,t
falling into the specified buckets in BTm
i
,t matches the one
indicated in P¯i,t. As a whole, each time the above checking
procedures are performed according to ϑmi,t at epoch t, nodes
will be partitioned into three sets, innocent set Iit, neutral
set, and suspicious set Sit containing innocent nodes, neutral
5Note that there would be the cases that a node is deemed to be both
innocent and suspicious when different subtree proofs are considered. When
such a case happens, that node obviously should be innocent.
nodes, and suspicious nodes, respectively. We can conclude
that (
⋂
i∈Wt,Sit 6=∅
Sit)
⋃{M} contains at least one compro-
mised node injecting the false subproof if at least one Sit is
nonempty and ({s1, . . . , sN−1}\(
⋃
i∈Wt
Iit))
⋃{M} contains
at least one compromised node injecting the false subproof
otherwise. In more details, the authority at first only performs
the attestation [23], [24], [26] on the nodes in ⋂i∈Wt,Sit 6=∅Sit
or in {s1, . . . , sN−1} \ (
⋃
i∈Wt
Iit). Nonetheless, after the
attestation, if the nodes being attested are ensured to be not
compromised, then M should be the compromised node. It
can be observed that the size of the set of the nodes the
authority needs to perform the attestation has possibility of
being drastically shrunk so that the computation and commu-
nication cost required in the attestation will be substantially
reduced as well. It can also be observed that each time the
attestation is performed, at least one compromised node can
be recovered. The intuition behind the checking procedure can
be illustrated in Fig. 5. In addition, Fig. 6 depicts the number
of nodes to be attested after an incomplete reply is found
in different settings. Since the number of witness nodes is
approximately ξ2(N − 1)/2ℓh , it can be observed from Fig. 6
that the larger the ξ2 and m, the lower the number of nodes
to be attested. Nevertheless, when ξ2 and m become larger,
the communication cost of the modified SRQ scheme, which
will be presented later, is increased as well.
There, however, would still be the cases where the compro-
mised nodes luckily act as witness nodes so that they can be
considered innocent by sending genuine subtree proof to M.
In our consideration, this case does happen, but our technique
also successfully mitigates the threat of false-incrimination
attacks because the effectiveness of false-incrimination attacks
is now limited within the case where some compromised nodes
work as witness nodes.
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Fig. 6: The number of nodes to be attested for (a) N = 500 and (b) N = 1000.
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Now, we have to remove the two unrealistic assumptions we
made before, allowing that the bogus data can be injected and
the subtree proof sent from the witness node has possibility
to be maliciously altered on its way to the authority. After
the removal of these two unrealistic assumptions, SRQ is
still resilient against collusion attacks because the use of the
proofs guarantees that the misbehavior of deleting the sensed
data will be detected. Unfortunately, on the one hand, the
compromised nodes injecting the bogus data can deceive the
authority into accepting the falsified sensor reading. On the
other hand, the compromised nodes lying on the path between
M and witness nodes can manipulate the subtree proofs so
that the compromised nodes can avoid the detection and the
innocent M can still be falsely incriminated. In our strategy,
we use the redundancy property, which have been widely used
in the design of the other security protocols in WSNs such
as en-route filtering, to mitigate the former threat, while we,
motivated by the IP traceback technique in internet security lit-
erature, develop a new traceback technique suitable for WSNs
to resist against the latter attack. Here, the redundancy property
means that usually WSNs are densely deployed so that an
event in the sensing region can be simultaneously detected by
multiple nodes. In general, the redundancy property can be
obtained by achieving the so-called t-coverage and therefore,
an event can be simultaneously observed by at least t nodes.
In the following description of our remedy to these problems,
due to its similarity to our modified SRQ scheme previously
mentioned, we will omit some notational details, stressing on
the procedures itself.
When the redundancy property is used, in essence, our
SRQ does not need to be changed. Assume for now that, the
authority issues a range query and receives the query-result
from M. In addition, we also assume that all the checking
procedures stated in (modified) SRQ are passed. The authority
now wants to know whether the received data are falsified by
and sent from the compromised nodes. Recall that each node
can be aware of its geographic position. After knowing which
nodes contribute the sensed data to its issued query from the
query-result, the authority further acquires the encrypted data
of the neighbors of those nodes from M. Note that this can
be achieved because when geographic positions of all nodes
are known by the authority6, inferring the one-hop neighbors
of a specific node can be easily achieved. Finally, for each
node in the query-result, the authority checks the consistency
of its sensor reading and the sensor readings of its one-hop
neighbors. The sensed data will be rejected as long as it is
inconsistent with the sensor readings of its neighbors. The
consistency checking procedure here may allow for certain
measurement errors or environmental factors, which should
be domain-specific and user-defined.
Now, we turn to address another problem that the subtree
proofs transmitted from the witness node to the authority
6As long as each node knows its position, it sends in a multihop manner
its position to the authority with the MAC constructed by the key uniquely
shared with the authority. This kind of operations are only performed once
after the sensor deployment.
could be maliciously altered by the compromised (storage
or sensor) nodes. To deal with this kind of threat, we need
a mechanism, by which the receiver not only can know
whether the received message is modified by the intermediate
nodes, but also can point out the node modifying the message
if it does exist. Motivated by the IP traceback techniques,
we develop a recursive traceback mechanism. To be more
specifically, each node si on the path connecting the M and
the witness node, after receiving D, where D denotes the
subtree proof, from its descendant node, attaches hashKi,t(D)
to D and then forwards D||hashKi,t(D) to its ascendant node
on the underlying aggregation tree. Note that it is assumed that
the witness node receives D||∅. Thus, with this modification, a
subtree proof received by the authority should be accompanied
with ψ hashes, where ψ is the number of nodes (including
storage nodes and the witness node itself) between a specific
witness node and the authority. Here, we should note that
because the topology of the aggregation tree is known by
the authority, when the subtree proof is sent, the IDs of
intermediate nodes except for the ID of the witness node
itself do not need to be attached7. Hence, when the query-
result is deemed incomplete, before conducting the procedures
defined in the subtree sampling technique to attest nodes,
the authority checks whether the received subtree proof is
maliciously altered by the intermediate node. In particular,
assume that the subtree proof and its ψ associated hashes,
D||hD1 || · · · ||hDψ , where hDi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ψ, is the hash calculated
by the node that is (i − 1)-hop away from the witness node
and hD1 is computed by the witness node itself according to
its asserted subtree proof, are received by the authority. After
the reception of D||hD1 || · · · ||hDψ , the authority checks the
consistency of the hash backward; i.e., it first checks hDψ , and
then hDψ−1, and so on. If such a verification can be successfully
proceeded all ψ hashes, then the subtree proof D is considered
to be intact. Otherwise, once the verification fails in, say, hDj ,
we can conclude that the subtree proof was altered by the
corresponding node since the innocent node is not assumed to
behave in such a way.
Recall that the communication cost of original SRQ is
O(N + d logN). In the modified SRQ without those two
unrealistic assumptions, each node si at epoch t is required
to additionally send ϑ0i,t, . . . , ϑm−1i,t , leading to O(N) com-
munication cost. At epoch t, approximately ξ2(N − 1)/2ℓh
witness nodes will send their subtree proofs to M. Never-
theless, when the subtree proofs are sent to M, since the
additional hashes will be added, its communication cost will
be O(N · (√N + (√N − 1) + · · · + 1)). As a result, the
communication cost becomes O(N2 + d logN).
Basically, STQ can be regarded as a special use of SRQ.
Thus, its resiliency against false-incrimination attack is the
same as that of SRQ. Nevertheless, due to the nature of top-
k query, the injection of the falsified sensor reading from
7The path from any sensor node in the aggregation tree to M is unique.
The authority can infer the nodes the subtree proof traverses once it is aware
of the ID of the witness node.
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the compromised nodes will imply a significant query-result
deviation. As a consequence, the resilience against collusion
attack of STQ should be reconsidered and it is discussed in
the extended version [32] of this paper.
Impact of Sensor Node Compromise on SSQ. Recall
that two aforementioned unrealistic assumptions are made. We
first consider the resiliency against false-incrimination attacks.
The simplest method is to introduce a parameter ξ3 ≤ ξ1
so that M reports to the authority all the verification seeds,
instead of the hash of them in original SSQ. After that, for
each group, if at least ξ3 out of ξ1 verification seeds can
be successfully verified, then the quasi-skyline data in that
group are considered complete. Hence, the threat of false-
incrimination attacks will be mitigated because the adversary
is forced to send at least ξ1 − ξ3 + 1 false proofs, instead of
single one false proof. With even one verification seed from
a specific group failed to be verified, we can conclude that at
least one compromised sensor node exists in that group.
Now, we consider collusion attacks. In SSQ, both M
and sensor nodes only know the quasi-skyline data. Recall
that quasi-skyline data are not necessarily the skyline data.
Thus, even when there is more than one compromised sensor
node in a group, the probability of successfully dropping the
skyline data is actually small. More specifically, to drop the
skyline data at a specified epoch, s should contain at least ξ3
sensor nodes responsible for sending hash values in order to
successfully forge a proof of incomplete quasi-skyline data,
and at the same time should be fortunate enough to select
groups whose quasi-skyline data contain skyline data8.
Now, we consider both the collusion and false-incrimination
attacks. To drop the skyline data, the only thing M can do
is to drop the data of certain groups. Here, for simplicity, we
consider the case where M drops the data of a fixed group Gη,
η ∈ [1, µ], in which a set s of x sensor nodes is compromised.
To prevent the detection of incomplete query-result, ξ3 out of x
compromised sensor nodes should be the sensor nodes respon-
sible for sending the proofs. The probability that at least ξ3 out
of ξ1 nodes responsible for sending the proofs are contained
in s is p1 =
∑ξ1
j=ξ3
(
ξ1
j
)(
|Gη|−ξ1
x−j
)
/
(
|Gη|
x
)
. In other words,
this is equal to the probability that the compromised sensor
nodes can drop the quasi-skyline data without being detected.
Quasi-skyline data, however, are not necessarily equivalent to
the skyline data. The probability that the quasi-skyline data
dropped by compromised nodes indeed contain skyline data
can be represented as p2 =
(
Y−pcY
|Gη|Y/N−pcY
)
/
(
Y
|Gη|Y/N
)
, where
pc is the average ratio of the skyline data to all the sensed data.
In short, this is equal to the probability that the operations per-
formed by compromised nodes cause the loss of skyline data.
As a whole, even if the adversary has x compromised nodes in
Gη , the probability of successfully making skyline query-result
incomplete is merely p1 · p2. The trends of such a probability
are depicted in Fig. 7 under different parameter settings. As
shown in Fig. 7a, p1 · p2 is decreased with an increase of
8Definitely, M can simply drop all the sensed data. Nevertheless, under
this option, it is forced to forge at least µ(ξ1 − ξ3 + 1) proofs (µ =
√
N in
our analysis), leading to high probability of being detected.
N and Y . This is because when N and Y become larger, it
is more unlikely that the quasi-skyline data dropped by the
adversary contains the skyline data. Nevertheless, as shown in
Fig. 7b, p1 ·p2 is increased with an increase of (ξ1− ξ3). This
is because when (ξ1 − ξ3) becomes larger, it is more likely
that s can forge a proof of an incomplete quasi-skyline data.
As a whole, from the false-incrimination attack point of view,
the larger the (ξ1 − ξ3), the lower the p1 · p2, but from the
collusion attack point of view, the smaller the (ξ1 − ξ3), the
lower the p1 · p2. This would be an optimization problem that
deserves further studying. In addition, compared with original
SSQ, the additional communication cost incurred from the
modified SSQ comes from the transmission of verification
seeds from M to the authority. Thus, the communication cost
of the modified SSQ scheme remains O(N 32 +Nd).
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Fig. 7: The probability of successfully dropping skyline data in the cases that (a)
ξ1 = 8 and ξ3 = 4, and (b) N = 500 and Y = 100.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose schemes for securing range query, top-k query,
and skyline query, respectively. Two critical performance
metrics, detection probability and communication cost, are
analyzed. In particular, the performance of SRQ is superior
to all the prior works, while STQ and SSQ act as the
first proposals for securing top-k query and skyline query,
respectively, in tiered sensor networks. We also investigate the
security impact of collusion attacks and newly identified false-
information attacks, and explore the resiliency of the proposed
schemes against these two attacks.
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